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Abstract
Neural Network-based Fault Diagnosis of Satellites Formation Flight
Shima Mousavi Mirak
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a methodology for detecting and isolat-
ing faults (i.e. fault diagnosis) in any of multiple reaction wheels that are commonly
employed as actuators in a consensus-based virtual structure controlled formation of
satellites. In order to accomplish this objective, a two-level fault diagnosis system
is developed based on Dynamic Neural Networks (DNNs). In the lower-level of the
formation ﬂight system hierarchy, a local fault diagnosis module is available in each
individual satellite. In this level, the fault diagnosis system may consist of a dynamic
neural network that is trained by using absolute measurements and states of each
single satellite. Unfortunately, a local fault diagnosis system may fail to detect the
presence of low severity faults. In an individual satellite these low severity faults
may not cause any serious complications with the speciﬁcations of the overall mis-
sion, however they can cause signiﬁcant impact on the satellite’s attitude or rates in
a given precision formation ﬂight of a network of satellites. Consequently, in order
to detect these low severity faults a fault detection system is required to be designed
and developed at the higher-level or the formation-level of the mission hierarchy. To-
wards this end, the highly nonlinear dynamics of the formation ﬂight and the reaction
wheels are modeled by using dynamic multilayer perceptron neural networks. The
proposed formation-level DNNs invoke the extended back propagation learning algo-
rithm and are trained based on sets of input/output data that are collected from the
relative attitude determination sensors of the 3-axis attitude control subsystems of
the satellites. The DNN parameters are adjusted to minimize certain performance
indices (representing the output estimation errors).
The capabilities of the proposed DNNs are investigated under various faulty situ-
ations, including single and multiple actuator fault scenarios and under high severity
and low severity faulty situations. Using a Confusion Matrix evaluation method, it is
demonstrated that by using the proposed fault detection and isolation (FDI) scheme,
iii
one can achieve a high level of accuracy and precision in detecting faults. The pro-
posed formation-level FDI system has capabilities in eﬃciently detecting and isolating
actuator low severity faults simultaneously.
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Spacecraft formation ﬂight is one of the key technologies for many future space mis-
sions. According to the deﬁnition in [1] formation ﬂight is a set of vehicles whose
dynamics are coupled through common control laws. In the early years of spacecraft
ﬂights, only one individual spacecraft was involved in most of the space ﬂight mis-
sions and it was controlled via specialized commands from distant ground stations [2].
In order to fulﬁll multi-task requirements of an individual spacecraft, multiple on
board instruments and payloads had to be designed and embedded in the spacecraft
structure and this single complex spacecraft was common in spacecraft missions for
scientiﬁc observations, weather monitoring, global navigation and civil relay commu-
nications [3].
One of the main disadvantages of developing a large complex spacecraft is that the
cost of design and developing the life cycle of a complex single spacecraft is normally
exceedingly high that many nations in the world cannot aﬀord the manufacturing and
launch costs of rockets and satellites. On the other hand, increasing the complexity
of satellite increases the likelihood of instability of the spacecraft in the mission, such
that a minor failure in the spacecraft may lead to a catastrophe in the entire ﬂight
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mission [3]. As a solution to these problems, researchers from the US National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) deﬁned the concept of formation ﬂight
as grouping of multiple spacecraft such that they can communicate with each other,
share payloads and transmit measurements and data in order to accomplish the ob-
jective of a single complex spacecraft, which is normally more expensive and less
reliable than a group of coordinated but less complex spacecraft [3].
Replacing a single large spacecraft with a group of multiple spacecraft has many
advantages: The multiple satellite approach is simpler and less expensive to man-
ufacture and it provides a high degree of reconﬁgurability and redundancy in case
of single vehicle failure or malfunction. Formation ﬂying of spacecraft approach is
adaptive to the failure in any of individual satellites and the failed satellite can be
replaced incrementally. Using a group of multiple spacecraft in the formation ﬂight
also provides more ﬂexibility in the mission, such that new technology can be included
in the preexisting missions [4].
One of the essential problems in formation ﬂying missions is control. In formation
ﬂight controller design, the size of the formation must be deﬁned ﬁrstly, and the task
also requires collision avoidance calculations, minimum amount of fuel consumption
and minimum sensor measurements and data communication. The essential part of
control problem in a group of spacecraft is developing control architectures and ad-
vance trajectory planning techniques [3].
In [87] ﬁve basic formation control architectures are deﬁned namely: Multiple-
Input, Multiple-Output (MIMO), Leader Follower (L/F), Virtual Structure (VS),
Cyclic and Behavioral. In the Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output architecture, the for-
mation is considered as a multiple-input, multiple-output plant and the formation
controller is designed by using the dynamic model of this formation plant. In the
L/F architecture, using a hierarchical approach, the problem of formation control
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is reduced to the individual tracking problem [1]. In the VS, the group of multiple
satellites behaves like a rigid body. Motions of the virtual structure and constant
speciﬁed orientations and positions of the virtual structure are used to determine the
trajectory that each individual satellite needs to follow. The formation control in
cyclic architecture is obtained by connecting individual controllers using cyclic algo-
rithms. In Behavioral architecture, the output of multiple controllers is combined to
achieve the desired diﬀerent behaviors.
One of the essential problems that are being investigated recently in the literature
is the problem of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) for formation ﬂight of satellites.
By deﬁnition, fault detection is the process of detecting the fault occurrence in the
system based on malfunctions or abnormalities in the system behavior. Once the
fault is detected, the next step is fault isolation. In this step, the faulty component
is identiﬁed. There are two main FDI methods available in the literature, namely:
model-based approach and process history-based approach using either qualitative or
quantitative modeling [9], [152].
Development of intelligent and learning-based methods for autonomously detect-
ing faults in a formation ﬂight, with minimal support and intervention of ground-based
operators is indeed a challenging research ﬁeld. The faulty component (either a faulty
actuator or sensor) must be detected and isolated as early as possible, before it could
lead to and result in serious damage or fatal failure in the formation control subsys-
tem. In learning-based approaches [10] such as neural networks and fuzzy systems,
a realistic model of component does not need to be provided. Due to capabilities
of neural networks to cope with nonlinearity, complexity, uncertainty and noisy and
corrupted data, they have been widely applied in domain of fault detection [149], [23].
Static nonlinear systems can be modeled by standard multilayer perceptron net-
works, but, in order to represent dynamic properties of a system, one needs to employ
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a dynamic neural network [46]. Dynamic neural networks are responsive to time vary-
ing signals due to their capabilities of internally generating and embedding memory.
In recent years, dynamic neural networks have been widely used in diﬀerent fault
identiﬁcation and fault detection and isolation applications [5], [6], [7], [8].
Attitude control subsystem of a satellite is responsible for orienting satellite to-
ward the desired attitude and stabilizing it despite the external disturbance torques.
The propulsion system plays an important role in formation ﬂying missions. Gyros
and reaction wheels can play the role of attitude control in most of formation ﬂight
missions. The actuators which are responsible for the satellite attitude control are
three reaction wheels on three axes of each satellite. Their main functionality is to
provide reaction torques for a spacecraft and store angular momentum [82].
Developing an FDI system for detecting and isolating faults in reaction wheels of
a formation ﬂying of spacecraft is a challenging problem. The desirable autonomous
FDI system must be capable of detecting faults and isolating the faulty reaction wheel
in the group of satellites.
1.1 Literature Review
1.1.1 Fault Detection and Isolation
Development of fault detection and isolation methods for autonomously detecting
faults in a formation ﬂight mission, with minimal support and intervention of ground-
based operators is indeed a challenging research ﬁeld. The faulty component (either
a faulty actuator or sensor) must be detected and isolated as early as possible, before
it could lead to and result in serious damage or fatal failure in the formation control
subsystem.
Detecting and isolating faults can be achieved by two main approaches, namely
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model-based and history-based approaches [10], [11] and [12]. In model-based ap-
proaches, a normal operating model of the system is constructed based on the prior
mathematical knowledge about the system. The output of this model is compared
with the actual output of the system, to generate the residual signal. This residual
signal is used as a fault indicating signal, that is, if the residual signal is close to zero,
the system is healthy and if the residual signal is distinguishably greater than zero,
the system is faulty. In history-based approach it is assumed that a large amount of
historical information is available. This data can then be presented as a prior knowl-
edge to the diagnostic system through feature extraction methods [12]. A detailed
classiﬁcation of fault diagnosis methods is depicted in Fig. 1.1.
In quantitative models, the physical understanding of the process is expressed in
Figure 1.1: Classiﬁcation of diagnostic algorithms [9].
terms of mathematical input-output relationships in the system [10]. In parameter
estimation method, it is assumed that the model structure is known, however the
model parameters are unknown and time varying. This method is especially suitable
for multiplicative faults and additive faults on the input and output signals. Using
this method, very small changes such as slowly developing and fast developing faults
are detectable [12]. In state estimation methods, model structure and model param-
eters must be known accurately. This method is especially suitable for additive fault
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detection, however using this method only relatively large faults are detectable. In
parity equations method, model structure and model parameters must be known and
must be ﬁt the process well. This method is especially suitable for additive faults.
Using this method some low severity faults can be detected. In case of abrupt faults,
state estimation and parity equation methods react faster than parameter estimation
method.
In qualitative methods, the physics of the process is expressed in terms of qual-
itative functions such as causalities or IF-THEN rules centered on diﬀerent units in
a process. The prior knowledge of physics of the system in the causal models can be
represented in diﬀerent forms, such as digraphs, fault trees, qualitative physics and
abstraction hierarchies [10]. In [13] fault detection in a satellite system is performed
based on a fault tree approach and the causes of a fault is determined by using the
same method. In [14] two correlation models are proposed to approximate the com-
plex correlation among sensor measurements of general systems.
The problem of fault detection and isolation in the attitude control subsystem of
a satellite has been studied in [15], [16], [17], [88] and [18] recently. In [17] a Multi-
Hypothesis Extended Kalman Filter (MEKF) for detection and identiﬁcation of sensor
and actuator failures is proposed. In [15] the FDI is accomplished by using the In-
teractive Multiple Models (IMM) approach. Towards this end, a bank of interactive
multiple Unscented Kalman Filters (UKFs) is developed. In [88] a fault diagnosis
technique is developed based on the interacting multiple model (IMM) algorithm for
partial (soft) or total (hard) reaction wheel failures in the spacecraft attitude control
system (ACS). In [20] a decentralized state estimation method is applied to estimate
the states of the formation ﬂying mission. In [18] a set of detection ﬁlters are designed
whereby through a combination of residuals the reaction wheel FDI decision making
is accomplished successfully. Since many modeling errors appear in the mathematical
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model of the system, the model-based FDI problem may result in having false alarms
or missing the fault eﬀects [19].
The process history-based methods are classiﬁed into two categories, namely: qual-
itative and quantitative. Qualitative history features can be extracted by expert sys-
tems and Qualitative Trend Analysis (QTA). Most faults in the system leave a trend
in the faulty actuator or sensor. This trend can be used to detect the underlying faults
in the system, before they lead to major failures in the system [11]. Expert systems
need an extensive detailed database and process experts. These methods are time
consuming to develop due to large amount of information and rules and their main
disadvantage is the uniqueness of knowledge and the necessity for updating rules [21].
Statistical and non-statistical classiﬁers are used to extract quantitative histori-
cal information. There are three main statistical feature extraction methods namely
Principle Component Analysis (PCA), Partial Least Squares (PLS), and statistical
pattern classiﬁers [11]. Quantitative feature extraction approaches essentially formu-
late the fault diagnosis problem as a pattern recognition problem. More details on
quantitative history-based approaches have been provided in [9], [10], [11].
In [90] a robust fault detection and isolation (FDI) scheme for a general nonlinear
system using a neural network-based observer is developed. Both actuator and sensor
faults are considered. Two recurrent neural networks are employed to identify general
unknown actuator and sensor faults. In [91] a practical solution to the problem of ro-
bust fault detection and isolation (FDI) for faults aﬀecting the thrusters of a satellite
system is proposed. This approach is based on both state estimation of an accurate
linear model of the satellite system and unknown input de-coupling to achieve robust
FDI in presence of severe dynamic uncertainty during main engine deployment.
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In [92] a systematic and transparent methodology within a hierarchical fault diag-
nosis framework for multi-platform space systems is proposed. A Bayesian network-
based hierarchical fault diagnosis methodology is proposed in [92] that allows fuzzy
rule-based reasoning at diﬀerent components in the hierarchy. In [100] a multi-level
fault diagnosis methodology utilizing fuzzy rule-based reasoning is proposed to en-
hance the level of autonomy in the fault diagnosis at the ground station. In [89] a
state space approach is used and a nonlinear-in-parameters neural network (NLPNN)
is employed to identify the additive unknown reaction wheel faults. This FDI scheme
is based on a hybrid model (composed of an analytical nominal model and a neural
network model) of the nonlinear system. In [94] a fault tolerant diagnosis system
for the RADARSAT-1 attitude control system (ACS) telemetry is developed. The
proposed system is using computational intelligence to detect and isolate faults and
determine the cause of failures from the telemetry data time series history using func-
tional models of the satellite ACS.
Figure 1.2: General structure of neural network-based FDI scheme.
1.1.2 Neural Networks for Fault Diagnosis
An important class of non-statistical classiﬁers is neural networks. In learning-based
approaches such as neural networks and fuzzy systems, a realistic model of compo-
nent does not need to be provided. Due to capabilities of neural networks to cope
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with nonlinearity, complexity, uncertainty and noisy and corrupted data, they have
been widely applied in the domain of fault identiﬁcation [36], [37], [38], [39] or fault
detection [22], [23], [42], [48], [24].
The general structure of neural network-based FDI is depicted in Fig. 1.2. Gen-
erating residual signals is the key part in detecting faults in a process. The dynamic
model of behavior of the system is generated by using a neural network. The diﬀer-
ence between the output of the neural network and the actual output of the system is
considered as the fault indicating signal (i.e. the residual signal). Generally, instead
of developing multiple linear models of the system for several operating points, it is
more advantageous to develop a nonlinear model of the system that works in a wider
range of operating conditions [9].
Sorsa in [23] utilized a multilayer perceptron network with hyperbolic tangent as
the nonlinear element for detecting faults in a realistic heat exchanger-continuous
stirred tank reactor system. In [25] the application of artiﬁcial neural networks for
detecting and isolating faults in robotic manipulators is discussed. In [25] the dy-
namics of the robotic manipulator is reproduced by using two neural network-based
approaches namely: multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural network and radial basis
function network (RBFN). In [26] the FDI scheme proposed in [25] is applied to
generate and analyze the fault indicating residual signals in multiple cooperative ma-
nipulators.
The application of neural networks as a solution for the problem of fault detection
and isolation has been widely discussed in the literature. Neural networks have been
proposed for classiﬁcation and function approximation problems. In general, neural
networks that have been used for fault diagnosis can be classiﬁed into two groups,
based on: (i) the architecture of the network such as radial basis functions; and (ii)
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the learning strategies such as supervised and unsupervised learning [11]. In the su-
pervised learning algorithms, using a predeﬁned topology for the neural network, the
connection weights have to be determined using the mismatch between the actual
and the desired output values. In that sense, supervised learning algorithms are suit-
able choices for fault classiﬁcation applications. The most popular neural network
learning strategy in the literature is the back-propagation algorithm. The problem
of fault diagnosis based on back-propagation learning method has been addressed
in [139], [140], [141], [142].
Most of the work on improvement of performance of standard back-propagation
algorithm are based on explicit presentation of features to the network. In [143] the
performance gains of neural networks are determined through the incorporation of
functional inputs in addition to the normal inputs to the neural networks. In [144]
the performance of the network is improved and the network training time is reduced
through data processing and ﬁltering. In [145] a combination of feedforward neural
networks and a recurrent neural network is used for better performance. In [146] the
integration of neural networks and expert systems is applied for better fault diagnosis.
As an improvement to the standard back-propagation learning method, basis func-
tions generating bounded decision regions could be better suited to the problem of
fault diagnosis [11]. In [147] radial basis neural networks are considered as a solution
for the fault diagnosis problem.
In [148] a wavenet is proposed as an improvement for standard back-propagation
method for the problem of fault diagnosis. Wavenet is a neural network with one
hidden layer and its basis functions are drawn from a family of orthonormal wavelets.
One important advantage of the wavenet is that due to the orthogonality property of
the wavelet basis functions, the nodes may be added or removed without retraining
the network.
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During recent decades, most of the work in the domain of neural networks has fo-
cused on static feed-forward neural networks. These networks have many applications
in the ﬁeld of pattern recognition where both input and output vectors represent the
spatial patterns and they are independent of time. The main motivation to develop
dynamic neural structures is that the signal delays are omnipresent in the brain and
play an important role in neurobiological information processing. In addition to bet-
ter representation of neurobiological neurons, the dynamic neuron also oﬀers better
computational capabilities as compared to the static neuron.
In [149] a neural network approach to design of a robust fault diagnosis system
is proposed. In this work a neural observer scheme is developed based on dynamic
multi-layer perceptrons with a mixed structure. In [150] a fault detection and isolation
(FDI) strategy based on a Dynamically Driven Recurrent Neural Network (DDRNN)
architecture is proposed This fault diagnosis method is applied for detecting and iso-
lating faults in case of actuator/thruster failure in a satellite.
In [28] the dynamics of the attitude control subsystem of a satellite is modeled by
using a recurrent neural network called Elman’s network. In this network, there is a
feedback from the output of the hidden layer to the input of the hidden layer. This
dynamic feedback allows the Elman’s network to learn the time-varying patterns and
dynamic features of the ACS model. In [30] an adaptive nonlinear parameter estima-
tion technique is used based on a highly accurate dynamic model of a reaction wheel.
The well-known standard back-propagation algorithm and back-propagation through-
time algorithm were employed inside the neural adaptation algorithms to obtain the
required performance. To make the optimization feasible for on-line application, the
optimal estimation functions are approximated by MLP neural networks. In [95] a
hierarchical dynamic neural network-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) scheme
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for pulsed plasma thrusters (PPTs) that are employed in the attitude control subsys-
tem (ACS) of satellites tasked to perform formation ﬂying (FF) missions is developed.
In [27] a Dynamic Multi-Layer Perceptron (DMLP) neural network that is pro-
posed in [32], [33], [34], [35] is used to detect faults in the attitude control subsystem
of a satellite. In this work, a generalized architecture of the same dynamic neuron
model is considered. In this type of neural network, instead of using of a global
feedback structure, dynamic neurons are used in feed-forward neural network archi-
tecture. In [151] the same dynamic neural network architecture is used to detect
faults in a highly nonlinear dynamic system corresponding to an aircraft jet engine.
1.1.3 Formation Flying of Spacecraft
The concept of formation ﬂight of satellites is a critical technology for future space
missions. One of the main problems in the ﬁeld of formation ﬂying of satellites is
guidance. Based on its deﬁnition, formation ﬂight guidance is the generation of any
reference trajectory that is used as an input for a formation member’s relative state
tracking control law [1]. The problems in the ﬁeld of formation ﬂying guidance are
divided into two main categories, namely deep space (DS) formation ﬂight missions
and planetary orbital environments (POE) missions. In deep space, relative spacecraft
dynamics reduce to a double integrator form [100], but in the POE the spacecraft are
subject to environmental disturbances and signiﬁcant orbital dynamics. A satellite
orbiting around the Earth is aﬀected by many perturbing forces, torques and distur-
bances. Due to the non-symmetric and non-homogenous characteristic of the Earth,
gravitational perturbation (J2) [134], [135], and gravitational torque [55] highly aﬀect
satellites in lower altitudes. In lower altitude the atmospheric drag, is one of the
dominating forces [134], [55]. Other major perturbing factors could be listed as solar
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radiation [136] and solar wind [134], the magnetic ﬁeld of the Earth, and the gravi-
tational force of the Moon and the Sun [137], [138]. Fig. 1.3 shows these perturbing
forces and torques and compares them in terms of severity.
In [96] the problem of formation reconﬁguration is precisely deﬁned and it is
Figure 1.3: The inﬂuence of the disturbing forces at diﬀerent altitudes [143].
reduced to the problem of permutation groups. In this case the fuel optimal re-
conﬁguration trajectories are straight lines with ”bang-coast-bang” control law and
collision avoidance is addressed by sequentially moving the spacecraft. Given a
new conﬁguration optimal, collision avoidance-constrained reconﬁguration trajecto-
ries are developed in [97], [98], [99]. In the POE dynamics are more complicated
and as a result, other methods are proposed for solving the reconﬁguration prob-
lem. In [101], [102], [103], [104] the problem of formation ﬂying reconﬁguration is
solved by using optimal control including linear programming and primer vector the-
ory. In [105] Hohmann transfers method and in [106] and [107] Lambert’s solution is
applied for solving the problem of reconﬁguration in formation ﬂights. Gauss’ varia-
tion of parameters equation [107], [108], [109], [110] and multi-impulse, sub-optimal
methods [111], [112], [113] have also been investigated.
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One of the other problems in the ﬁeld of formation ﬂying of satellites is developing
and designing of formation control techniques associated with stability analysis of the
tracking control laws. In general the formation size, precision and dynamic environ-
ment all aﬀect the formation ﬂying controller development [87]. The ﬁrst problem
in the ﬁeld of formation ﬂying controller development is the formation controller ar-
chitecture. In [87] ﬁve diﬀerent controller architectures are deﬁned namely: Leader/
Follower (L/F), Multi-Input/ Multi-Output (MIMO), Virtual Structure (VS), Cyclic
and Behavioral structure.
In the leader follower architecture, a hierarchical arrangement of individual space-
craft controllers is used that reduces the problem of formation ﬂying control to an
individual tracking problem [87]. Most of leader/follower algorithms in the literature
discuss a single leader/follower control algorithm in which all spacecraft in the for-
mation follow the same leader. The other common architecture is the one in which
each satellite follows its preceding satellite. It is normally assumed that if the follower
control laws are stabilizing, then the leader/follower connection of these controllers
becomes stable too. The problem of leader/follower deep space formation controller
design is studied in the following papers. In [114] and [115] feedback linearization
method and linear matrix inequalities (LMI) are combined to design a robust and
switched controller for avoiding control saturation. In [116] and [117] a variety of
control techniques including proportional/derivative (PD), time-optimal and mixed
fuel-time optimal are applied. [118] develops a rule-based control law for synchroniz-
ing the rotational motion of multiple spacecraft in the mission.
The problem of leader/follower controller design in the POE is discussed in the fol-
lowing papers. In [119] separate discrete-time controllers are designed for in-orbital
plane motion and out of plane motion. In [120] a similar decoupled controller is
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designed for GEO orbits. In [121] a discrete-time LQ controller is designed for distur-
bance rejection and a feedforward controller is designed for providing non-equilibrium
point control oﬀsets. Considering nonlinear control, [122] and [123] design position
feedback and output feedback controllers, respectively, for Keplerian relative orbital
dynamics.
In the virtual structure architecture, the overall network of satellites is considered
as a whole virtual rigid body. The motion of the virtual structure and the positions
and orientations of individual spacecraft within the formation are used to generate
reference trajectories for the spacecraft to track by using individual spacecraft con-
troller.
Two types of virtual structures are studied in literature:, namely Iterated Vir-
tual Structure (IVS) and Guidance Virtual Structure (GVS). In the IVS a forma-
tion structure is ﬁt to the current spacecraft positions at each time. The spacecraft
then track desired states with respect to the ﬁtted structure. The GVS consists of
an initial structure ﬁtting step, followed by the prescribed motion of the structure
to generate desired spacecraft trajectories [87]. Diﬀerent ﬁtting algorithms are dis-
cussed in [124], [125], [126] and [127]. Similar to the L/F, a formation controller in
the cyclic architecture is formed by connecting individual spacecraft controllers. In
Cyclic architecture, unlike leader/follower architecture, the controller connections are
not hierarchical [87]. In [128] a multi-neighbor strategy is proposed, in which each
spacecraft controls itself with respect to the center-of-mass (COM) of a subset of
neighboring spacecraft. A similar approach has been used in [129] and [130].
In the behavioral architecture the outputs of multiple controllers designed for
achieving diﬀerent and possibly competing behaviors are combined. A behavior is
deﬁned to be an objective such as collision avoidance or move-to-goal functions that
the spacecraft must individually or collectively perform [87]. Formation maintenance
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is one of the behaviors that must be fulﬁlled during the formation [129], [130].
In the multiple-input, multiple-output (MIMO) architecture, formation controllers
are designed by using a dynamic model of the entire formation system. In this ap-
proach, the formation is treated as a multiple-input, multiple-output plant. Within
this problem formulation, all the methods of modern control may be applied to for-
mation control. In [131] a minimal state space realization of formation relative states
is developed and a LQR controller is designed. In [132] each spacecraft has a full-state
LQC estimator that requires communicated information to function. In this paper a
local estimator is augmented so that less information communication is needed among
satellites in the formation. Nonlinear and constrained model predictive control (MPC)
for MIMO architecture has been developed in [133].
1.1.4 Objective of the Research
The main objective of this work is to propose a method for detecting and isolating
faults in reaction wheels of the formation ﬂying satellites. In order to design the
desirable dynamic neural network-based FDI system, diﬀerent FDI methods that are
used in the literature are reviewed and analyzed. Then the dynamics of each satellite
and the interactions among satellites are modeled. The group of satellites is controlled
based on the decentralized formation ﬂying control via virtual structure method [31].
Finally, a reliable FDI scheme is proposed in order to detect and isolate faults in
a formation ﬂying of satellites and the capabilities of the proposed FDI method is
evaluated under diﬀerent faulty conditions. the general structure of our proposed FDI
scheme is depicted in Fig. 1.4. In the last part of this thesis, a neural network-based
method is used to determine fault type and the severity of the fault that occurs in
the reaction wheels of spacecraft in formation ﬂight.
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Figure 1.4: Structure of a two-level FDI system for a formation ﬂying of satellites.
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1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The contributions of the work developed in this thesis are detailed as follows:
• A novel Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) scheme for the Reaction Wheels
(RWs) of the Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS) of formation ﬂying satellites
is proposed. Single satellite fault detection systems (i.e. local FD systems),
can detect high severity faults and attitude deviations, however, they fail to
detect low severity faults. These low severity faults may not cause any serious
diﬃculties with the speciﬁcations of the overall single satellite missions, how-
ever they can cause signiﬁcant impact on the satellite’s attitude or rates in a
given precision formation ﬂight of a network of satellites. Therefore, in order
to improve the fault diagnosis system in a network of satellites, a novel fault
detection scheme is proposed. Using this FD scheme, even low severity faults
can be detected and isolated before they cause any catastrophic failure in the
formation system. The capabilities of the proposed method have been investi-
gated through diﬀerent faulty scenarios. By means of proposed Dynamic Neural
Networks (DNNs) the proposed FDI system is capable to detect and isolate the
fault occurrence in any of multiple actuators (i.e. RWs).
• The results obtained show high level of accuracy (98%) and precision (100%) and
the mis-classiﬁcation rate and false faulty parameters are small (2%). Therefore,
the proposed DNN technique fulﬁlls the expected requirements of accuracy and
precision with minimum false alarms and mis-classiﬁcations.
• In this work a decentralized FDI scheme is proposed. The previous actuator
fault diagnosis systems developed for a single satellite in the literature [43],
[150], [13], [18], [29] use the absolute local measurements of an individual satel-
lite to detect fault occurrence in the actuators. In those methods, each satellite
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is only capable of detecting its own faults. In formation ﬂying missions, fault
occurrence in any of the satellites in the formation may inﬂuence the orientation
of the other satellites as well, and even when the fault is too severe it may re-
sult in a failure in the whole mission. Therefore, in a formation ﬂying missions,
developing a decentralized fault diagnosis method, in which each agent in the
formation is capable of detecting faults in its own actuators or actuators in the
neighboring satellites is the major contribution of this thesis. A formation ﬂying
of satellites including n satellites, #1, #2, . . .#i . . . #n having ring topology
are tasked to perform a formation ﬂying mission. In the ﬁrst fault diagnosis
scheme, a DNN-based fault diagnosis system is implemented along each axis of
each spacecraft in the formation and the DNN-based fault diagnosis system in
each spacecraft is trained using relative attitude measurements of that space-
craft with respect to its adjacent neighbor (for example DNNs in satellite #i
are trained based on relative attitude measurements of satellite #i and satellite
#(i+ 1)). Two fault detection schemes are investigated in this work.
In the ﬁrst scheme, when a fault occurs in one of the actuators of any of the
satellites (for example satellite #i) in the formation, the DNN-based fault diag-
nosis system in the faulty spacecraft can detect the faulty actuator immediately.
Since the DNNs in the neighboring satellite (satellite #(i− 1)) is trained based
on the relative attitude measurements of satellite #(i − 1) with respect to the
satellite #i, when a fault occurs in satellite #i it aﬀects the attitude of satellite
#i and consequently the relative attitude of satellite #i with respect to the
satellite #(i − 1). Hence, the DNN-based fault diagnosis systems in satellite
#(i− 1) also gets an impact of the fault after a time delay.
In the second fault diagnosis scheme, the DNN-based fault diagnosis system
along each axis of each spacecraft in the formation is trained by using relative
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attitude measurements of that spacecraft with respect to its two adjacent neigh-
bors in the formation. In this scheme, the DNNs in satellite #i are trained by
using the relative attitude measurements of satellite #i with respect to its two
adjacent neighbors #(i − 1) and #(i + 1). Therefore, when a fault occurs in
one of the actuators of satellite #i, the DNN-based fault diagnosis system in
satellite #i can detect the fault immediately, but since the DNNs in satellite
#(i− 1) are trained based on relative attitude of satellite #(i− 1) with respect
to satellite #i and satellite #(i−2), when a fault occurs in satellite #i it aﬀects
the attitude of satellite #i and consequently the relative attitude of satellite #i
with respect to satellite #(i−1). Therefore, DNNs in satellite #(i−1) can also
detect the fault occurrence in satellite #i after a time delay. Also, since the
DNN in satellite #(i+ 1) is trained using relative attitude of satellite #(i+ 1)
with respect to satellite #i and satellite #(i+2), when a fault occurs in satellite
#i, it aﬀects the attitude of satellite #i and consequently the relative attitude
of satellite #i with respect to satellite #(i+1). As a result, when a fault occurs
in one of the actuators of satellite #i, the DNNs in satellite #(i + 1) can also
see the eﬀect of fault after a time delay. This second scheme requires more
information exchange among spacecraft in the formation, but it enhances the
precision and accuracy of fault detection and decreases the false alarms and in
the second scheme, the neighboring satellites in the formation can detect the
fault with smaller time delay.
• In this work, after detecting the health status of the reaction wheel and the
fault occurrence time, a neural classiﬁer is proposed to determine the fault type
(bus voltage fault, motor current fault or viscous temperature fault) and fault
severity.
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1.2.1 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of this thesis is as follows: In Chapter 2, a classiﬁcation of available
fault diagnosis methods in the literature is provided and the structure of the Dynamic
Neuron (DN) and Dynamic Neural Network (DNN) that are used in this work are
described. In the next section, the detailed model of the formation ﬂying of satellites
and the decentralized control algorithm that is incorporated is brieﬂy described. In
Chapter 3, the decentralized fault detection scheme for the formation of ﬂying satel-
lites is described and the capability of the proposed scheme in detecting and isolating
faults is evaluated under diﬀerent faulty cases. In Chapter 4, a method for fault type
classiﬁcation and fault severity estimation is proposed. Finally, the conclusion and




During recent years, the problem of developing fault detection and isolation (FDI)
strategies for dynamical systems has been widely researched. A traditional approach
in fault diagnosis is based on hardware redundancy that requires additional sensors
or actuators to measure and control a speciﬁc variable. This method usually employs
a voting technique to determine the health status of the system. Although the hard-
ware redundancy method is very reliable and has been widely used in many systems,
its main disadvantage is the need for multiple equipment and hardware that leads to
extra maintenance cost and additional space to accommodate the redundant compo-
nents [40].
Recently, much research has been performed on developing mathematical/analytical
based approaches for fault detection and isolation in dynamical systems. These model-
based approaches are mainly based on developing a mathematical model of the sys-
tem. Constructing mathematical models for nonlinear and complex systems is quite
time consuming and complex [27]. Due to limitations and diﬃculties of model-based
FDI schemes [21], [41], [42] in this thesis an artiﬁcial neural network-based method
is employed for fault detection and isolation purposes.
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Speciﬁcally, during recent years a great deal of attention has been paid on devel-
oping dynamic neural networks, due to their capabilities in modeling and identiﬁca-
tion of nonlinear dynamical systems, control and ﬁltering applications [39], [44], [45].
Dynamic neural networks can eliminate some of the shortcomings of static neural
networks. The ﬁrst drawback of static neural networks is that the information ﬂows
only in one direction. This implies that the information ﬂows from the input neuron
A to B, to C never comebacks to A in feedforward networks. On the other hand the
structure of static neuron is mainly based on a simple summation operation and it
is not dynamic in nature. Hence, it cannot provide a complete model for dynamic
systems. Time delays are one of the inherent characteristics of biological neurons.
This property is not taken into account in static neuron models.
In the structure of dynamic neural networks feedback is employed between the
neurons of a layer, and/or between the layers of the network. The feedback paths
from the outputs to the inputs, implies that the network has a local memory and its
response is recursive. This implies that the network receives the inputs, calculates
output and adjusts the weights, and then the output is recalculated. After successive
iterations, the weight parameters are adjusted such that the error between the ac-
tual output and the network output becomes smaller and smaller. Diﬀerent types of
dynamic neural network approaches have been discussed in literature, including re-
current neural networks [46], [47], brain-state-in-a-box (BSB) neural model [46], [50],
time-delay neural networks (TDNNs) [46], [48] and dynamic neural unit [49], [33].
The common feature of all types of dynamic neural networks is their capability of
internally generating and embedding memory. This adds dynamic properties to the
network, so that it will be responsive to time-varying signals. One way to introduce
dynamic properties to a standard multilayer perceptron (MLP) network is by adding
multiple recurrent connections with time delay units. An alternative approach is
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Figure 2.1: Multilayer perceptron architecture [86].
to add dynamic properties to a MLP network by embedding dynamic neurons that
contain inﬁnite impulse response (IIR) ﬁlters in the structure of a static feedforward
MLP network.
2.1 The Architecture of the Multilayer Perceptron
A multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network is a static neural network that receives
the input data and maps the input data set into appropriate output data set [86].
The structure of a feed-forward multilayer perceptron network is depicted in Fig. 2.1.
2.1.1 The Generalized Delta Rule
The learning rule for the multilayer perceptron is known as ”the generalized delta rule”
or the ”back-propagation rule”. The generalized delta rule repetitively calculates an
error function for each input and backpropagates the error from one layer to the
previous one. The weights for a particular node are then adjusted in direct proportion
to the error in the units to which it is connected.
Let
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Ep= error function for pattern p ;
tpj = target output for pattern p on node j ;
opj = actual output for pattern p on node j ;
oij = weight from node i to node j ;






(tpj − opj)2 (2.1)




The output from each unit j is determined by the nonlinear transfer function fj:
opj = fj(netpj) (2.3)





where k is a positive constant that controls the ”spread” of the function. The delta
rule implements weight changes that follow the path of a steepest descent on a sur-
face in the weight space. The height of any point on this surface is equal to the error
measure Ep. This can be shown by verifying that the derivative of the error function
with respect to each weight is proportional to the weight change dictated by the delta
rule, with a negative constant of proportionality, i.e.,
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Δpwi =∝ − ∂Ep
∂wij
(2.5)
2.1.2 The Multilayer Perceptron Learning Algorithm Using
The Generalized Delta Rule
In order to train a multilayer perceptron neural network, the following three steps
must be followed:
• Initialize weights (to small random values) and transfer function.
• Present input.
• Adjust weights by starting from output layer and working backwards.
wij(t+ 1) = wij(t) + ηδpjopi (2.6)
where wij(t) represents the weights from node i to node j at time t, η is a learning
gain term, and δpj is an error term for pattern p on node j.
• For output layer units:
δpj = k.opj(1− opj)(tpj − opj) (2.7)
• For hidden layer units:




Figure 2.2: Structure of a dynamic neuron model with P inputs [53].
where the sum is over the k nodes in the following layer. The learning rule in a
multilayer perceptron is not guaranteed to produce convergence, and it is possible for
the network to fall into a situation (the so called local minima) in which it is unable
to learn the correct output.
2.2 Dynamic Neuron Model
A Dynamic neuron is constructed by adding an Inﬁnite Impulse Response (IIR) ﬁlter
to a conventional of static neuron. The structure of an IIR ﬁlter is depicted in Fig.
2.3. By adding this IIR ﬁlter to the general structure of the static neuron, the neuron
activity depends on its internal states and therefore, the neuron does indeed process
past values of its own activity y(k) and its inputs up(k), for p = 1, 2, . . . P ; where P is
the number of inputs and k is the discrete time samples. The structure of a dynamic
neuron is depicted in Fig. 2.2. The dynamic neuron receives P inputs and in the ﬁrst
step, the weighted sum of the inputs is calculated according to equation 2.9 [53]:




where w = [w1, w2 . . . wp]
T denotes the weight vector and u = [u1(k), u2(k) . . . up(k)]
T
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Figure 2.3: Structure of a second order IIR ﬁlter [34].
denotes the input vector.
In the next step, the calculated weighted sum of the inputs x(k) is passed through








aiy˜(k − i) (2.10)
where n denotes the ﬁlter order, a = [a1, a2 . . . ap]
T is the feedback weight vector,
b = [b1, b2 . . . bn]
T is feedforward weight vector, and x(k) and y˜(k) denote the input
and output of the ﬁlter respectively. Finally, the neuron output is expressed as:
y(k) = F (g.y˜(k)) (2.11)
where g is the slop parameter of the activation function and F (.) is the nonlinear
activation function. In this structure the slop parameter g has an adaptive nature
thus the dynamic neuron can model the biological neuron better. In case of a nonlinear
squashing activation functions i.e. hyperbolic tangent or sigmoidal, the undesirable
saturation eﬀect can be compensated by application of the slop parameter g [52].
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2.2.1 Extended Dynamic Back-propagation Algorithm
Dynamic multilayer perceptron (DMLP) is obtained by embedding proposed dynamic
neurons in feed-forward multilayer perceptron architecture. Since there are no recur-
rent links in dynamic multi-layer perceptron network, the DMLP can be trained based
on the back-propagation rule. In an Extended Dynamic Back-Propagation (EDBP)
algorithm [52], the calculated output of the network is propagated back to the net-
work, through the hidden layers, containing dynamic neurons. This method can work
in both on-line and oﬀ-line training modes [52].
Consider a dynamic neural network with M -layer of dynamic neurons described
by the diﬀerentiable activation function F (.). Fig. 2.4 shows the structure of an M -
layered feedforward neural network. In this ﬁgure, Sm denotes the number of neurons
in the m-th layer and ums denotes the output of the s-th neuron of the m-th layer at
discrete time k (m=1,2. . . ,M,s=1,2. . . ,Sm). The activity of the s-th neuron of the
m-th layer is deﬁned according to equation (2.12):
ums (k) =F (y˜1(k)) = F (g
m






















s (k − i)))
(2.12)
The main objective of the learning process is to adjust the parameters of the
network, based upon a given set of an input-output data. Starting from a small
number of hidden layers and neurons, number of hidden layers can be increased until













Figure 2.4: The M-Layered feedforward neural network [7].
Where e(k) denotes the output error as a diﬀerence between the actual output of the
system (y(k)) and the desired output of the system yd(k). The unknown network
parameters that must be adjusted are:
• Weight matrix [wmsp] : m = 1 . . .M, s = 1 . . . Sm, p = 1 . . . Sm−1.
• Filter feedback parameter matrix [amis ] : m = 1 . . .M, s = 1 . . . Sm, i = 1 . . . n.
• Filter feedforward parameter matrix [bmis ] : m = 1 . . .M, s = 1 . . . Sm, i = 1 . . . n.
• Slope parameter matrix [gms ] : m = 1 . . .M, s = 1 . . . Sm.
According to the Extended Dynamic Back-Propagation (EDBP) algorithm, the pa-
rameters of the s-th neuron of the m-th layer are adjusted according to equation
(2.14):
vms (k + 1) = v
m






where v = [w, a, b, g] represents the parameter vector (i.e. weight vector, ﬁlter pa-
rameters or slop parameter), η is the learning rate, δms is the generalized output error
and Smvs denotes the sensitivity function for the elements of the parameter vector v.
The generalized output error is described as follows [5]:












• Output layer generalized output error:
δMs (k) = es(k)F
′(y˜M1s (k)) (2.16)
The sensitivity function is deﬁned as follows:













wps(k − i)) (2.17)
• Sensitivity with respect to the feedback parameter amis :
Smais(k) = −gms y˜ms (k − i) (2.18)





s (k − i) (2.19)
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Based on equations (2.14) to (2.20) the updating laws for the network parameters
may be rewritten as follows:
• Hidden layers parameters:
– Weight parameter wmsp:

























– Filter feedback parameter amis :















s (k − i)
(2.22)
– Filter feedforward parameter bmis :















s (k − i)
(2.23)
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– slope parameter gms

















• Output layer parameters:
– Weight parameter wmsp:


















– Filter feedback parameter amis :
ams (k + 1) = a
m
s (k)− η(es(k)F ′(y˜M1s (k)))gms y˜ms (k − i) (2.26)
– Filter feedforward parameter bmis :
bms (k + 1) = b
m





s (k − i) (2.27)
– Slope parameter gms :
gms (k + 1) = g
m





2.3 Spacecraft Attitude Representation
Representation of the orbital and translational motion of a rigid body in space de-
pends on its reference coordinate system. Many diﬀerent coordinate systems are used
to analyze process and display data, because in various physical processes, calcula-
tions may be easier to perform or better understood in one coordinate system rather
than another. In this thesis, four coordinate systems and two diﬀerent attitude rep-
resentation techniques that are mostly used in the ﬁeld of aerospace attitude control
are presented.
2.3.1 Coordinate Systems
Representation of position and orientation of a spacecraft depends on its reference
coordinate system. In this section, three coordinate systems that are commonly used
in the ﬁeld of aerospace attitude control are introduced. Speciﬁcally,
• Earth Centered Inertial Frame (ECI). This is a non-accelerated reference frame
in which Newton’s laws are valid. The origin of this frame is located at the center
of Earth. The z-axis is oriented toward the North Pole, the x-axis points towards
to the ﬁrst point of Aries. This axis is in the equatorial and ecliptic planes and
the y-axis completes the right-handed orthogonal set. This coordinate system
is shown in Fig. 2.5 [54].
• Earth Centered earth Fixed (ECF). This coordinate system has its origin in the
center of the Earth. The x-axis points to Greenwich meridian and it is located
in the equatorial plane. The z-axis coincides with the Earth’s rotational axis
and is positive towards to North Pole and the y-axis completes the right-handed
orthogonal set. This coordinate system is shown in Fig. 2.6 [54].
• Satellite Body Fixed. In this coordinate system, the origin is located in the
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Figure 2.5: Earth centered inertial frame [153].
Figure 2.6: Earth centered Earth ﬁxed frame [153].
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Figure 2.7: Satellite body ﬁxed frame [153].
center of gravity (mass) of the satellite. The x-axis is parallel to the Orbiter
structural body axis, the z-axis is parallel to the Orbiter plane of symmetry and
perpendicular to the x-axis and y-axis completes the right-handed orthogonal
set [54]. This coordinate system is shown in Fig. 2.7.
• Local Orbital Frame. In this coordinate system, the origin is located in the
center of mass of the vehicle. The x-axis lies in the vertical orbital plane,
perpendicular to the z-axis and it is positive in the direction of the motion of
the vehicle. The z-axis lies along the geocentric radius vector to the vehicle and
is positive towards the center of the Earth and y-axis completes the right-handed
orthogonal set. Fig. 2.8 shows the local orbit reference frame.
2.3.2 Attitude Representation
The formulation of spacecraft attitude dynamics and control problems involves rep-
resentation of the satellite kinematics. The orientation of a rigid body in space can
be represented either by using Euler angles or the unit quaternions [55].
• Euler Angles In this scheme, the deviation angles with respect to a reference
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Figure 2.8: Local orbit frame [153].
frame are used to represent the attitude of the satellite. These deviation angles
are given as roll angle ϕ, pitch angle θ, and yaw angle ψ, about the satellite
body ﬁxed coordinate system. One scheme for orienting a rigid body to a
desired attitude is called a body-axis rotation. This representation involves
successively rotating the rigid body about the axes of the rotated, body-ﬁxed
reference frame [56]. The most common sequence of rotation is deﬁned by a
ﬁrst rotation about z-axis (yaw angle), a second rotation about y-axis (pitch
angle) and a ﬁnal rotation about x-axis (roll angle).
Consider three successive body-axis rotations that describe the orientation of a
reference frame B relative to a reference frame A. Suppose that the following
rotation sequence is considered:
C3(ψ) : A
′ ← A (2.29)
C2(θ) : A” ← A′ (2.30)
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C1(ϕ) : B ← A” (2.31)




































































































In equations (2.29) and (2.31), A′ and A” are two intermediate reference frames.















These three angles θ, ϕ and ψ are called the Euler angles [56]. In order to avoid
singularity that may occur in the Euler angles representation, another attitude
representation, namely the quaternions representation, is introduced next [57].
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• Euler Parameters or the Quaternions. The four Euler parameters are deﬁned
as follows:
q1 = e1sin(θ/2) (2.36)
q2 = e2sin(θ/2) (2.37)
q3 = e3sin(θ/2) (2.38)





3 = 1 (2.40)
where θ represents the rotation angle and e = [e1, e2, e3]
T represents the rotation
axis. We deﬁne a vector q = [q1, q2, q3]
T such that:
q = esin(θ/2) (2.41)








4 = 1 (2.42)
The Euler parameters are also called quaternions [56]. Suppose that qa and
qb represent attitude of satellite a and b in unit quaternions, respectively. By
deﬁnition, the relative attitude of satellite a with respect to satellite b is [58]:
qa/b = qa∗qb (2.43)
where qa∗ is the conjugate of a unit quaternion qa and according to the deﬁnition
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[59]:
q∗ = [−qˆT q¯]T ∈ R4 (2.44)
The product of two quaternions is deﬁned as:
qp =
⎡




where for vectors v = [v1, v2, v3]
T and w = [w1, w2, w3]
T , the cross product is
deﬁned as [59]:









2.4 Equations of Motion
The equations of motion that describe the rotational dynamics of a satellite can be
described by a set of nonlinear dynamic and kinematic equations as follows.
• Attitude Dynamic Equations of a Satellite. In order to provide a modeling of the
satellite dynamics, it is assumed that each spacecraft acts as a rigid body and as
a point mass model for orbital dynamics. With these assumptions, according to
the Newton-Euler’s rotational equations of motion of a rigid body, the attitude
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dynamics of the spacecraft becomes [60]:
	T = 	˙h+ 	ω × 	h = I.	˙ω + 	ω × (I.	ω) (2.48)
	T b = 	T bgrav + 	Taero + 	Treact (2.49)
where I is the matrix of inertia, ω is the rotational rates of body frame, h is
the angular momentum, T is the torques acting on the satellite in the body
frame, 	T bgrav is the gravitational torque working on the satellite body, 	Taero is
the aerodynamic torque and 	Treact is the reaction wheel torque.
A satellite orbiting the Earth is inﬂuenced by many perturbing forces,
torques and disturbances and noise. Gravitational perturbation (J2) and grav-
itational torque highly aﬀect a satellite in the lower altitudes due to the non-
symmetric and non-homogenous characteristics of the Earth. The atmospheric
drag is a dominating force at low altitudes whereas for high altitude orbits it
may be ignored. Other major perturbing factors could be listed as solar radia-
tion and solar wind, the magnetic ﬁeld of the Earth, and the gravitational force
of the Moon and the Sun [60].
• Attitude Kinematic Equations of a Satellite. The kinematic equations of the
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2.5 Formation Flying of Satellites
During the recent decade, spacecraft formation ﬂying has become an exciting ﬁeld of
research. Spacecraft formation missions have several beneﬁts over the single-satellite
mission, namely:
• There is a lower launch risk if the system is distributed across several launch
platforms.
• The greater range of structural conﬁgurability may oﬀer a lower launch cost for
a ﬂeet of vehicles.
• Although the initial design cost for several spacecraft may be higher than a
single spacecraft, the beneﬁts of mass production can eventually result in lower
per-vehicle cost.
• Using a group of spacecraft provides a level of redundancy in a high risk environ-
ment. If a fault occurs in one spacecraft in the formation, the mission will not
be entirely compromised. In such a case the other spacecraft in the formation
will be able to operate until the faulty spacecraft is replaced or repaired.
• The reconﬁgurability of the spacecraft in the formation is also beneﬁcial for
technology upgrades. This allows the new vehicles in the formation to be dy-
namically introduced to the system.
42
• The inherent redundancy in the formation ﬂying system allows each individual
spacecraft to be less robust- and thereby less expensive- with less risk to the
mission.
Considering all these beneﬁts, teams of space vehicles have been suggested for a
variety of scientiﬁc and strategic space missions [61].
2.5.1 Formation Flying Control Architectures
Five formation control architectures are reported in the literature [1], namely Leader/Follower,
virtual structure, Multi-Input/Multi-Output, Behavioral and Cyclic.
• Leader/Follower. In the leader/follower approach one spacecraft is designated
as the leader and the rest of spacecraft in the formation are designated as
the followers. In this architecture, the leader satellite tracks a prescribed
state proﬁle (i.e. attitude and position) and each spacecraft in the forma-
tion tracks the attitude and position of the leader spacecraft with a (possibly
time varying) prescribed oﬀset [62]. Numerous variations on the leader/follower
architecture, including designating multiple leaders or forming a chain is stud-
ied in the literature [67]. Several leader/following approaches are discussed
in [62], [64], [65], [66].
• Virtual Structure. In the virtual structure architecture the entire formation
ﬂying of spacecraft is treated as a single rigid body. In this scheme, the desired
state proﬁle of the virtual structure is deﬁned and in the next step the motion
dynamics of the virtual structure is translated into the desired motion of each
single spacecraft in the formation and ﬁnally the tracking control laws for each
spacecraft are derived. The application of virtual structure control architecture
in multi-agent systems is studied in [68], [69], [70].
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• Behavioral. In the behavioral approach several desired behaviors including col-
lision avoidance, obstacle avoidance, goal seeking and formation keeping behav-
iors are prescribed to each agent and the control action of each agent is the
weighted average of the control for each behavior. This formation ﬂying control
approach is reported in [71], [129], [72], [73], [74].
• Multi-Input/Multi-Output. In the Multi-Input/ Multi-Output approach, the
entire formation ﬂying dynamics is modeled as a multi-input/multi-output plant.
In this approach, all the modern control techniques may be applied to control
the formation. In [84], [85], [86] diﬀerent multi input/multi-output formation
control methods are studied.
• Cyclic. In the cyclic approach, the formation controller is designed by con-
necting individual spacecraft controllers. The cyclic formation ﬂying control
approach is similar to leader-follower control architecture; however in the cyclic
approach the spacecraft controller connections are not hierarchical. This ap-
proach is studied in [75], [76], [77].
The main advantage of the virtual structure control approach is that it is easy to
prescribe the behavior for the group of agents and the virtual structure can maintain
a tight formation during the mission [31]. Motivated by advantages of this approach,
a decentralized formation ﬂying control scheme via the virtual structure is used in
this thesis.
2.5.2 Dynamics of Earth Orbiting Formations
One of the problems in modeling of a formation ﬂight is providing a dynamic model
of multiple spacecraft in space. The three-body problem describes the motion of
three point masses under their mutual gravitational interactions. From astronomical
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point of view the moon’s traveling around the Earth, or the motion of stars together
with their planets in a speciﬁc constellation or even the Universe can be considered
as an N -body problem. In order to simplify this problem, necessary steps are made
according to the order of the magnitude of certain objects in the original dynamic
motion equation. In a three-body system of the Earth, the Moon and the man-
made spacecraft, the size of man-made spacecraft is obviously much smaller that the
Earth and the Moon. The Hill problem [154] and the linearization model studying
spacecraft rendezvous and docking with a short separation distance in between by
the Clohessy and Wiltshire [83] has become the basis of formation ﬂight dynamic
equations. The Hill- Clohessy-Wiltshire (HCW) equations have high ﬁdelity because
the perturbations do not aﬀect it so much and the relative motions and the time
scales are small [3].
2.5.3 Formation Dynamics: Linearized Equations of Motion
The linearized equations of motion for a formation ﬂying are given by:














where in case of a circular reference orbit, the angular rate of the orbital frame (called






Further R˙0 = R¨0 = 0 where R0 is the radius of the earth-centered orbit and
μ = 3.986× 105[Km3
s2
] denotes the gravitational parameter of the Earth. In equations
(2.52) to (2.54) the parameters xi, yi and zi represent the position of the i-th spacecraft
in the rotating frame F0 and Qxi, Qyi and Qzi represent the generalized force vector
components that also contain all disturbance forces acting on the formation. These
equations are called the Hill-Clohessy-Wiltshire (HCW) equations [83].
2.5.4 Formation Flying Architecture and Controller Design
In this work the formation ﬂying virtual structure architecture consists of four space-
craft that are located on a plane. In this structure, instead of using a set of desired
location and orientation for each spacecraft, we take advantage of virtual structure
approach to deﬁne the desired pattern of the virtual structure.
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T where rF , vF , qF and ωF represent the position,
velocity, attitude and angular velocity of the virtual structure with respect to the iner-
tial frame and λ represents the expansion or contraction rate of the virtual structure.
If each satellite has knowledge of the state of the formation, ξ and its own desired po-
sition and orientation with respect to the virtual structure, then the formation ﬂying
control problem is transformed to the individual satellite control problem. Therefore
the virtual structure state parameter, ξ is the minimum amount of information needed
by each spacecraft in the formation to coordinate itself with the group. In this ap-














This vector deﬁnes the desired states of the formation ﬂying. In this work it is assumed




F = 0. In
this approach the formation maneuver goal can be achieved through a set of forma-
tion patterns [31]. In [31] the formation pattern is deﬁned such that each spacecraft
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Figure 2.9: Decentralized control architecture via the virtual structure approach [31].
tracks a trajectory speciﬁed by the state of the virtual structure. In this approach the
certain shape of the formation is preserved and collision avoidance is handled more
eﬃciently.
Each spacecraft in the formation instantiates a local copy of the coordination














T . The satellites in the formation communicate their
instantiation of the coordination vector using a bidirectional ring topology. In this
decentralized approach, instead of a discrete-event supervisor and formation control
module at a centralized location, each spacecraft has a local copy of the discrete-event
supervisor, G and the formation control module F , denoted by Gi and Fi for the i-th
satellite, respectively. The structure of the decentralized controller architecture via
the virtual structure is depicted in Fig. 2.9.
Before the group maneuver starts, a sequence of formation patterns is prescribed
to each discrete-event supervisor Gi. The goal of Gi is the transition through a set
of formation patterns so that the group maneuver goal can be accomplished sequen-
tially. When the group maneuver starts, each discrete-event supervisor, Gi, outputs
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the current formation pattern, yGi to the formation control module, Fi. The local
formation control module instantiates a local copy of the coordination vector, ξi. The
goal of Fi is to evolve the coordination vector ξi to the desired formation pattern ξ
d
and synchronize ξi with the coordination vector instantiations in other spacecraft.
In [58], it is assumed that the spacecraft communicate the coordination vector
instantiations using a bidirectional ring topology. That is, spacecraft #i sends its
instantiation, ξi, to its two adjacent neighbors, spacecraft #(i+ 1) and #(i− 1) and
it receives the coordination vector instantiations of spacecraft #(i+1) and #(i− 1).
The formation control module, Fi, sends its coordination vector instantiation, ξi to
the local spacecraft controller, Ki.
In the local spacecraft controller module, Ki, the desired states of the spacecraft
#i is derived from equations (2.56) and (2.57) based on ξi:
[rdi ]0 = [rF ]0 + C0FΛ[r
d
iF ]F (2.56)
[vdi ]0 = [vF ]0 + C0F Λ˙[r
d
iF ]F + [ωF ]0 × (C0FΛ[rdiF ]F ) (2.57)
[qdi ]0 = [qF ]0[q
d
iF ]F , [ω
d
i ]0 = [ωF ]0 (2.58)
where C0F is the rotational matrix from the initial frame F0 to the formation frame
FF . The reference frame FF is ﬁxed at the virtual center of the formation, that is,
the virtual structure, as a formation frame and Λ = diag(λF ).






iF ) relative to the forma-







relative to the initial frame are time varying and their evolution equations are given
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by:
[r˙di ]0 = [v
d
i ]0 (2.59)
[v˙di ]0 = [v˙F ]0 + 2[ωF ]0 × (C0F Λ˙[rdiF ]F ) + C0F Λ¨[rdiF ]F + [ω˙F ]0 × (C0FΛ[rdiF ]) (2.60)
[q˙di ]0 = [q˙F ]0[q
d
iF ]F , [ω˙
d
i ]0 = [ω˙F ]0 (2.61)
where the local controller Ki, is designed to guarantee that each spacecraft will track
its desired states zFi and zi indicate the formation and local controller feedback
respectively [58].
2.5.5 Formation Control Strategies for Each Spacecraft
The desired states of each spacecraft in the formation must satisfy the translational
and rotational dynamics of the spacecraft. The translational dynamics of each space-
craft relative to F0 are given by:
drdi
dt0




where mi and fi are the mass and the control force of the i-th spacecraft, respectively.






















= −ωdi × (Jiωdi ) + τ di (2.65)
The control force, fi and the control torque, τi for the i-th spacecraft are given by:
fi = mi[v˙
d






ωi × Ji(ωi + ωdi )−Kqiq̂d∗i qi −Kwi(ωi − ωdi ) (2.67)
where Ji is the moment of inertia for the i-th spacecraft, Kvi, Kri and Kwi are
symmetric positive deﬁnite matrices, Kqi is a positive scalar, and qˆ represents the
vector part of the quaternion.
2.5.6 Formation Control Strategies for Each Virtual
Structure Instantiation
In [58] a behavior-based approach is applied to synchronize the coordination vector
instantiations during the maneuver as well as to evolve it to its desired goal at the
end of the maneuver. The goal seeking error, EG is deﬁned as the total diﬀerence





||ξi − ξd||2 (2.68)





||ξi − ξi+1||2 (2.69)
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Deﬁning the total error as E(t) = EG(t) + ES(t), the control objective is to
drive E(t) to zero asymptotically. In the virtual structure method, the coordination
vector represents the states of the virtual structure and it is supposed that the i-th

























The proposed control force, fFi and the control torque, τFi are given by:
fFi =mF{−KG(rFi − rdF )− ΓGivFi −KS[rFi − rF (i+1)]−DS[vFi−
vF (i+1)]−KS[rFi − rF (i−1)]−Ds[vFi − vF (i−1)]}
(2.71)
τFi =− kGq̂d∗F qFi − ΓGiωFi − kS ̂q∗F (i+1)qFi −DS[ωFi − ωF (i+1)]
− kS ̂q∗F (i−1)qFi −DS[ωFi − ωF (i−1)]
(2.72)
where ΓGi is the formation feedback term, and it is a positive deﬁnite matrix, mF
and JF are the virtual mass and the virtual inertia of the virtual structure, KG is
a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix, KS and DS are positive semideﬁnite matrices,
and qˆ represents the vector part of the quaternion.
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Figure 2.10: Attitude control operation [80].
2.6 Modeling of the Attitude Control Subsystem
of a Spacecraft
The Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS) of a spacecraft deals with the orientation
of the spacecraft with respect to one of the reference frames. The attitude control
task requires sensors to measure the current attitude of the vehicle, actuators such
as reaction wheels or thrusters to correct the attitude of the spacecraft and a control
algorithm to determine the magnitude and direction of the torque in response to
disturbances.
The block diagram of the attitude control operation of a spacecraft is depicted in
Fig. 2.10. If the spacecraft drifts oﬀ from the desired attitude, the error is detected
by sensors that are implemented in the spacecraft. The control law determines the
response force or torque that is required to correct the attitude orientation and directs
the proper actuator to correct it [80].
2.6.1 ACS Sensors and Actuators
Depending on the mission requirements and environmental situations the spacecraft
must be equipped with speciﬁc sensors and actuators.
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• Sensors. The sensors in the spacecraft determine the complete attitude infor-
mation (i.e. angles and angular velocities) of a spacecraft with respect to a
reference frame. Some of the commonly used sensors in the spacecraft systems
are listed below:
– Sun sensors: When the sun sensors are illuminated by sun radiation, the
speciﬁc material in them produces an output current signal. Measuring
this electric signal, the Sun incidence angle with the surface illuminated
can be determined. These sensors have been designed with diﬀerent accu-
racies and normally the sun sensors can be calibrated based on the mission
requirements. In addition to attitude determination purpose, the sun sen-
sors can be used for instrument pointing, solar panel pointing and thermal
requirement veriﬁcation [81].
– Horizon sensor (Earth sensor): When the spacecraft is rotating close
to a planet, in order to determine the satellite attitude, the precise position
of the center of the planet has to be evaluated. These sensors work based
on analyzing the area in Field of View (FOV) of a satellite that are not
illuminated (deep space), compared to the illuminated area (planet). In
general, in order to reduce the eﬀects of interference, the infrared sensors
are designed for which the ratio of the Earth radiation to the Sun radiation
is ”1 to 400” [81]. The accuracy level of the Earth sensor is almost in the
same level as that of the Sun sensor.
– Magnetic ﬁeld sensor: In order to provide attitude information, this
sensor measures the magnetic ﬁeld vector. The measurement of this sensor
must be coupled with mathematical model of the magnetic ﬁeld and the
position of the satellite. It is not simple to measure a constant magnetic
ﬁeld and there is always uncertainty in the direction and the amount of
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the magnetic ﬁeld that is determined by these sensors. That is the reason
why the magnetometers must always be coupled with other measurements
to provide reliable attitude determination [81].
– Star sensor: This sensor determines the attitude of the vehicle based on
the position of the stars in the space. The maximum attitude determi-
nation accuracy that is attainable using the sun sensors is 1
8
of a degree.
If the orbit has a phase in the eclipse, sun is not always visible and sun
sensors cannot be used for attitude determination. Using the star sensors
the accuracy of the attitude determination is improved and by selecting
the appropriate star to observe, no eclipse problem arises. Due to these
advantages, sun sensors are more expensive in terms of construction and
operation on board of a satellite.
– Gyroscopes: The gyroscopes are used to measure the angular velocity
of the spacecraft. They provide information on the rotational rates of the
spacecraft in the inertial frame.
• Actuators. The main responsibility of actuators in a spacecraft is generating
torques or forces that are required to change the orientation or position of the
spacecraft. Some of the most known actuators in spacecraft attitude stabiliza-
tion is presented below:
– Reaction Wheel: Reaction wheels work based on acceleration and decel-
eration of spinning rotors. The actuators which are responsible for satellite
attitude control are three reaction wheels on three axes of each satellite.
Their main functionality is to provide reaction torque for a spacecraft and
store angular momentum [82]. The advantage of using reaction wheels as
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actuators in attitude control subsystem of a satellite over other types of ac-
tuators (like magnetic actuators) is that their capability of controlling the
satellite is independent from their geographical location and altitude [82].
The disadvantage is mainly in moving parts, the weight and the expense.
In general, a reaction wheel structure consists of a rotating ﬂywheel that
is driven by an internal brushless DC motor [82].
– Magnetotorquer: Magnetic actuators produce a torque by inducing a
magnetic dipole in a coil that is surrounded by the magnetic ﬁeld of Earth.
Due to the variation in the Earth’s magnetic ﬁeld, the eﬀectiveness of these
actuators depends on their height from the Earth. As the spacecraft moves
in its orbit, the direction of the magnetic ﬁeld changes and the attitude
control system gains controllability about the three axes. Magnetotorquers
can normally provide torques in the range of 10−3 to 10−6Nm.
– Thrusters: The simplest way to create torques is to create a set of forces
with directions not aligned with the center of mass, and this can be ob-
tained by mass explosion techniques. In thrusters, acceleration of a propel-
lant is used to generate a force in the direction of which the propellant is
discharged. Due to ignition transient, jet thrusters are not used for precise
attitude control. The torque needed in control purposes is in the order
of milli-Newton-meters, but the force generated in chemical thrusters is
in the order of at least one Newton. In order to make it compatible with
attitude control, they are switched on and oﬀ with a given modulation, but
this even increases the problem due to ignition transients and mechanical
problems in the thruster. Using chemical thrusters it is not possible to
control the magnitude of the force. These problems can be solved by using
electric thrusters. Electric thrusters can be easily modulated in amplitude,
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Figure 2.11: Ideal reaction wheel model.
they have reduced propellant consumption and they are well suited for ﬁne
attitude control. Due to the large power consumption of electric thrusters,
these actuators are always coupled with large solar panels [81].
2.7 Mathematical Model of Nearly Ideal Reaction
Wheel
The fundamental block diagram of a nearly ideal reaction wheel is depicted in Fig.
2.11. An ideal reaction wheel does not have any friction torque, and the only loss
that is subtracted from the motor torque is the friction torque. In this block diagram,
the torque command voltage is the only input which controls the motor current and
the motor torque. The angular momentum stored in the ﬂywheel, Hz is calculated
from the equation (2.73):
	Hz = J	ω (2.73)
According to the Newton’s third law, the reaction torque applied to the spacecraft
is the opposite of the net torque on the ﬂywheel. The reaction torque, τz, can be
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derived according to the Newton’s second law and is given by:








The net torque is the motor torque, τm, less any frictional losses, τd or :
τn = τm − τd (2.75)
2.7.1 Mathematical Model of High Fidelity Reaction Wheel
In general, reaction wheel structure consists of a rotating ﬂywheel that is driven by
an internal brushless DC motor. A detailed block diagram of a high ﬁdelity reaction
wheel is depicted in Fig. 2.12. This model consists of ﬁve main sub-blocks: (1) motor
torque control, (2) speed limiter, (3) EMF torque limiting, (4) motor disturbances,
and (5) bearing friction and disturbances. Table 2.1 provides the typical parameters
for the ITHACO’s standard type A reaction wheel [84].
2.7.2 Reaction Wheel Dynamics
The fundamental relationships for a high ﬁdelity mathematical model of a reaction
wheel system are provided in the section below.
• Motor Torque Control: The motor driver is basically a voltage controlled current
source with a gain, Gd. The motor current is proportional to the torque com-
mand voltage. The motor torque control block generates a motor current that
is proportional to the torque command voltage and converts this current into






Figure 2.12: Detailed high ﬁdelity reaction wheel block diagram [84].
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Table 2.1: Typical values of type A reaction wheel [84].
Variable Nomenclature Unit Value
J Flywheel inertia N.m.s2 0.0077
Gd Driver gain A/V 0.190
Kt Motor torque constant N.m/A 0.029
Ke Motor back-EMF constant V/rad/s 0.029
Ks Over-speed circuit gain V/rad/s 95
ωs Over-speed circuit threshold rad/s 690
τc Coulomb friction N.m 0.002
N Number of motor poles - 36
B Motor torque ripple coeﬃcient - 0.22
Rin Input resistance Ω 2.00
Torue command range V ±5
Kf Voltage feedback gain V/V 0.50
Pq Quiescent power W 3.00
ωa Torque noise high pass ﬁlter frequency rad/sec 0.20
θa Torque noise angle deviation rad 0.05
Rb Bridge resistance Ω 2.00
• EMF Torque Limiting: In low bus voltage conditions, due to the increasing
back-EMF, Ke of the motor, the motor torque may be limited at high speeds.
Once the back-EMF increases to the motor driver’s saturation point, this may
result in eliminated voltage headroom and reduced torque capacity. The back-


















mRB + 0.04|Im|VBUS + Pq + ωImke) (2.78)
In the schematic model of a high ﬁdelity reaction wheel, a heavyside function
Hb is included in the block diagram. The main responsibility of this function
is to eliminate the voltage drop when the power is not being drawn from the
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bus [84].
• Speed Limiter: The main responsibility of speed limiter circuit is to prevent the
ﬂywheel from reaching unsafe speeds. Once the speed of the wheel exceeds the
established threshold, ωs, speed limiter circuit measures the wheel speed with
an analog tachometer circuit and provides it as a high-gain negative feedback,
ks, into the torque command. A heavyside function Hs is included in the block
diagram of the speed limiter that enables the negative feedback by comparing
the wheel speed with the threshold, ωs [84].
• Motor Disturbances: Due to the motor excitation and the magnetic construc-
tion, the torque motor in the reaction wheel can be a source of high frequency
disturbances. In the most current reaction wheels, brushless DC motors are
employed. These motors generate torque ripple disturbances at the commu-
nication frequency and cogging at a frequency corresponding to the number
of motor poles and rate of rotation. Torque ripple is the amount of variation
in motor torque, depending on the communication method and the back-EMF
shape. Codding is a type of disturbance that is always present in conventional
brushless DC motors that may lead to undesirable behavior specially when op-
erating near zero speed. Cogging is due to the change in reluctance of the iron
stator as the magnets in DC motor are rotated [84].
• Bearing Friction and Disturbances: The drag friction in the reaction wheels of
a satellite generally can be broken into two components, including the viscous
friction, τv and the coulomb friction, τc. The viscous friction in the bearings
is due to the bearing lubricant and it varies with speed and temperature. The
viscous drag friction has been characterized for the ITHACO’s Type A and B
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reaction wheels to be given by:





The coulomb friction, τc, is independent of the temperature or speed of the
wheel and it is mainly caused by rolling friction and its polarity depends on the
direction of rotation of the wheel [84].
• Torque Noise: Torque noise is the very low frequency torque variation of the
bearings and it is a function of lubricant dynamics. This noise is present in
typical band-width of the spacecraft controllers and it has the most signiﬁcant
eﬀect on spacecraft pointing. Torque noise is speciﬁed as the deviation from
the ideal location of the rotor at any constant speed. This speciﬁcation can be




2.8 Reaction Wheel Fault Types
In general, there are three types of faults that occur in reaction wheels of a satellite
and may result in serious damage or catastrophic failures:
• Bus Voltage Fault: The bus voltage must be high enough to avoid elimination
of the voltage headroom. When the bus voltage drops down, the motor torque
may be limited due to the increasing amount of back-EMF of the motor and it
will lead to reduced torque capacity of the wheel and instability in the attitude
of the satellite. For very low values of bus voltage, the entire attitude control
system will break down and the attitude of the satellite will be out of control.
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• Motor Current Fault: Motor torque is directly related to the motor current
through a constant parameter kt. When the motor current drops from its nom-
inal value, the corresponding motor torque will drop down accordingly. When
the current loss becomes serious, the reaction wheel cannot provide enough re-
action torque and the attitude control loop of the satellite tends to become
unstable.
• Temperature Fault: The viscous friction in a satellite’s reaction wheel is the
main friction factor and is highly related to the temperature. When the tem-
perature becomes too high, this implies that the bearings have been damaged
and this results in increased viscous friction. The temperature fault may lead
the satellite into abnormal operating condition.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter the structure of static and dynamic neural networks that will be used
for FDI purposes in the next chapters is presented in detail. In this thesis, a Dynamic
Multilayer Perceptron (DMLP) network will be utilized as a fault detection tool and
a static multi layer perceptron network is applied as a fault type recognition tool.
in the next section. A review on the attitude control subsystem (ACS) of a satellite
was also provided and various attitude representations and coordinate systems are
explained.
A list of actuators and sensors has also been provided in detail. The concept of
fomration ﬂying system and ﬁve diﬀerent control approaches for formation ﬂight con-
trol are introduced. The decentralized control architecture via the virtual structure
that will be used in the following chapters of this thesis to simulate attitude maneuvers
under healthy and faulty actuator situations is also described in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Actuator Fault Detection for
Formation Flight of Satellites
In order to develop a fault detection (FD) system that has the capability of detect-
ing and isolating low severity faults, a decentralized dynamic neural network-based
approach is proposed in this chapter. Details on the structure of the dynamic neural
structure, the neuron’s dynamic model and the extended dynamic back-propagation
(EDBP) training algorithm have already been provided in chapter 2.
3.1 Fault Detection for a Single Spacecraft
In [43] the dynamic neural network (DNN) that was introduced in Section 2.2 is ap-
plied for detecting and isolating faults on a three-axis ACS model. The components
of the developed neural fault detection scheme are depicted in Fig. 3.1. This DNN
is specially developed for fault detection purposes in the attitude control subsystem
of a satellite. where Vtorquecommand and τ
estimated
reaction represent the normalized command
voltage and estimated reaction torque, respectively and τactualreaction represents the nor-
malized desired value of the output reaction torque. The proposed DNN needs only
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Figure 3.1: Neural network based FD system of a single satellite.
one input in order to construct a suitable identiﬁcation model and produce an output.
3.1.1 Training Phase
In this thesis, the modeled ACS actuator, that is the reaction wheel, has one input
(torque command voltage) and one output (reaction torque) along each satellite axis.
These input/output data pairs are collected under healthy operating condition of the
spacecraft and are used for training purposes. Preprocessing steps are performed on
the input/output data pairs so that all the data used for DNN training are normalized
in the range of [-1, +1]. The training process is then carried out based on an extended
dynamic back-propagation algorithm for each axis.
The network parameters are initialized with small random values and the IIR
ﬁlter’s denominator coeﬃcients are initialized to zeros. The structure of the dynamic
neural network contains one hidden layer of hyperbolic tangent activation functions
and one output layer of linear activation functions. The neurons embedded in the
structure of the dynamic neural network have second order IIR ﬁlters. The training
process is started from a relatively small network structure and the optimum structure
is obtained by incrementally increasing the number of hidden neurons until required
performance speciﬁcations are met. The training phase is conducted for each DNN
64
that is employed along each axis of the satellite. The best results are obtained using
a N1−8−1 structure, which implies that there is one neuron in the input layer, 8
neurons in the hidden layer and one neuron in the output layer. The learning rate
parameter is set to 0.01. The training process is accomplished by using Monte Carlo’s
simulations under diﬀerent noisy conditions for 50000 steps and each step is 0.001 sec.
The networks are trained for 100 diﬀerent pairs of input/output data in presence of a
normally distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences
between the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output data intervals.
The average value of the mean square error in the 100 training iterations is 0.0141
and its standard deviation is 0.0002, which is quite acceptable. The performance of
the networks during the training phase for 3 axis of satellite #1 is depicted in Fig.
3.2.
3.1.2 Testing Phase
The representation capability of the trained DNNs is evaluated in the testing phase.
In the testing phase another input/output data set is used to evaluate the capabil-
ities of the trained DNNs to model the reaction wheel system. The testing step is
accomplished for 100 diﬀerent pairs of input/output data in presence of a normally
distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences between
the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output data intervals. The aver-
age value of the mean square error in the 100 testing samples is 0.16 and its standard
deviation is 0.02, which is quite acceptable. Fig. 3.3 shows the output of the actual
and the neural model in the testing phase in the three axes of the satellite #1. The
results indicate that the trained DNNs have the ability to represent dynamic model
of the reaction wheels, and therefore they can detect malfunctions that could occur in




Figure 3.2: The performance index (mean squared error of the output reaction torque)
curve for the dynamic neural network- satellite #1 (a) x-axis, (b) y-axis (c) z-axis.
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can be accomplished in a similar way.
3.1.3 Reaction Wheel Fault Detection Strategy
The trained dynamic neural networks are to be used to detect reaction wheel faults
in the satellite. After training and testing the proposed DNNs, they will be used to
generate residual signals. The diﬀerence between the actual output of the reaction
wheel that is measured by using the torque sensors in the satellites and the estimated
output that is obtained from the DNN is called residual signal. This signal is used
for health status determination of actuators in the satellites.
The general fault detection scheme is depicted in Fig. 3.1. In this thesis a simple
threshold technique is used for each axis. In this method, a lower and upper threshold
bounds are determined for each axis of a satellite and any deviation from this range
is considered as a fault. In order to determine the threshold boundaries, ﬁrst the
residual signals that are generated during various healthy operating conditions are
analyzed. The mean value (X¯) and the standard deviation (σ) of these signals are
calculated, and the threshold value is then calculated by using the following formula:
t.h = X¯ ± 3σ (3.1)
3.2 Actuator Fault Scenarios
3.2.1 Single Fault Scenarios
In order to investigate fault detection capabilities of the constructed residual genera-
tors, diﬀerent faulty cases under various noisy situations are considered. Speciﬁcally,
• Bus voltage (VBUS) Fault. In the low bus voltage conditions, the motor torque




Figure 3.3: Testing curve (actual and estimated outputs) for the DNN - (a) x-axis,
(b) y-axis, and (c) z-axis of the satellite #1.
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[49]. In this thesis, three diﬀerent bus voltage fault scenarios are considered and
the fault indicator signals that are produced in residual generators are shown in
Figs. 3.4- 3.6. The fault diagnosis is carried out in the steady state response of
the satellite so that if the monitored output (i.e. reaction torque) exceeds the
predeﬁned threshold value it can be detected as a fault.
– First scenario: In this case, a low bus voltage (80% drop in nominal value)
fault is injected in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000.
Fig. 3.4 shows the residual signal that is generated along the x-axis of
the satellite. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed dynamic neural
network along the x-axis is capable of detecting the fault successfully.
– Second scenario: In this case, a low bus voltage (60% drop in nominal
value) fault is injected in the y-axis of the satellite at the time sample
of 5000. Fig. 3.5 shows the residual signal that is generated along the
y-axis of the satellite. This ﬁgure shows that the proposed dynamic neural
network along y-axis has the ability of detecting the fault successfully.
– Third scenario: In this case, a low bus voltage (50% drop in nominal value)
fault is injected in the z-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000.
Fig. 3.6 shows the residual signal that is generated along the z-axis of
the satellite. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed dynamic neural
network along the z-axis of the satellite is capable of detecting the fault
successfully.
• Motor current (Im) fault. As given in equation (2.76), the motor torque in a
reaction wheel is proportional to the motor current through the motor torque
constant, kt. Therefore, when a fault occurs in the motor driver gain, it inﬂu-





Figure 3.4: Residual error signals in case of a bus voltage fault: (a) x-axis, (b) y-axis,





Figure 3.5: Residual error signals in case of a bus voltage fault: (a) x-axis, (b) y-axis,





Figure 3.6: Residual error signals in case of a bus voltage fault: (a) x-axis, (b) y-axis,
and (c) z-axis - Scenario 3.
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the motor torque. In this thesis, three diﬀerent motor current fault scenarios
are considered and the fault indicator signals that are produced in the residual
generator are shown in Figs. 3.7- 3.9.
– First scenario: In this case, a low motor current (60% drop in nominal
value) fault is injected in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample
of 5000. Fig. 3.7 shows the residual signal that is generated along the
x-axis of the satellite. This ﬁgure shows that the proposed dynamic neural
network for the x-axis is capable of detecting the fault successfully.
– Second scenario: In this case, a 50% drop of nominal value of motor current
fault is occured in the y-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000.
Fig. 3.8 shows the residual signal that is generated in the y-axis of the
satellite. This ﬁgure clearly shows that this dynamic neural network can
detect the fault occurence successfully.
– Third scenario: In this scenario, a 70% drop of nominal value of motor
current fault is injected in the z-axis of the satellite at the time sample of
5000. The residual signal that is generated in the z-axis of the satellite is
depicted in Fig. 3.9. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the fault occurrence
in the z-axis can be detected using the proposed dynamic neural network
successfully.
• Viscous temperature (τv) fault. The friction model of the spacecraft is designed
for a limited range of temperatures. Since in the friction model of the reaction
wheel the bearing viscosity depends on the operating temperature, any ﬂuctu-
ations in the normal temperature will be reﬂected as ﬂuctuation in the drag
torque. In this thesis, three diﬀerent temperature fault scenarios are considered





Figure 3.7: Residual error signals in case of a motor current fault: (a) x-axis, (b)





Figure 3.8: Residual error signals in case of a motor current fault: (a) x-axis, (b)





Figure 3.9: Residual error signals in case of a motor current fault: (a) x-axis, (b)
y-axis, and (c) z-axis - Scenario 3.
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shown in Figs. 3.10-3.12.
– First scenario: In the ﬁrst scenario, a temperature fault that results in an
increase of 50% in the nominal produced viscous torque is injected in the
x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000. Fig. 3.10 shows the
residual signal that is generated in the x-axis of the satellite. This ﬁgure
shows that the proposed dynamic neural network is capable of detecting
the fault occurrence successfully.
– Second scenario: In the second case, a high temperature fault (60% increase
in the nominal produced viscous torque) is injected in the y-axis of the
satellite at the time sample of 5000. Fig. 3.11 shows the residual signal
that is generated by the residual generator in the y-axis of the satellite.
This ﬁgure clearly shows that using this dynamic neural network the fault
occurrence can be detected successfully.
– Third scenario: In this case, a temperature fault that results in an increase
of 70% in the nominal produced viscous torque is injected in the z-axis
of the satellite at the time sample of 5000. The residual signal that is
generated by the residual generator in the z-axis of the satellite is shown
in Fig. 3.12. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed dynamic neural
network in z-axis is capable of detecting the fault successfully.
3.2.2 Multiple Fault Scenarios
In order to further evaluate the capabilities of a single satellite fault detection system,
the following multiple fault scenarios are considered:
• First scenario: In this scenario, a motor current fault (60% drop in nominal





Figure 3.10: Residual error signals in case of a temperature fault: (a) x-axis, (b)





Figure 3.11: Residual error signals in case of a temperature fault: (a) x-axis, (b)





Figure 3.12: Residual error signals in case of a temperature fault: (a) x-axis, (b)
y-axis, and (c) z-axis - Scenario 3.
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Figure 3.13: Multiple fault scenarios - scenario #1: residual error signal in the x-axis.
and then it is followed by a viscous friction fault (60% increase in nominal
value) in x-axis of satellite at the time sample of 10000. Fig. 3.13 shows the
residual signals generated by the DNN in the x-axis of the satellite. This ﬁgure
shows that when the motor current fault occurs at the time sample of 5000, the
residual signal passes the threshold and indicates a faulty situation. When the
temperature fault occurs at the time sample of 10000, the residual signal still
stays unhealthy, but it generates false alarms (actual faulty signal, estimated
healthy) in some points.
• Second scenario: In this scenario, a motor current fault (60% drop in nominal
value) has occurred in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000 and
then at the time sample of 10000, a bus voltage fault (60% drop in nominal
value) has occurred in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 10000.
The residual signal that is generated by the DNN in the x-axis of the satellite
is depicted in Fig. 3.14. This ﬁgure shows that when the motor current fault
81
Figure 3.14: Multiple fault scenarios - scenario #2: residual error signal in the x-axis.
occurs at the time sample of 5000, the residual signal exceeds the threshold
and indicates the fault occurrence. When the bus voltage fault occurs at the
time sample of 10000, the residual signal still remains faulty, however some false
alarms (actual faulty signal, estimated as a healthy signal) are also generated.
• Third scenario: In the third scenario, a high temperature fault (70% increase in
nominal value of viscous friction) has occurred in the x-axis of the satellite at
the time sample of 5000 and then it is followed by a bus voltage fault (70% drop
of nominal value) in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 10000. Fig.
3.15 shows the residual signal that is generated by the DNN in the x-axis of the
satellite. This ﬁgure clearly shows that when the temperature fault occurs at
the time sample of 5000, the residual signal passes the threshold and becomes
faulty. The residual signal still remains faulty when the bus voltage fault occurs
at the time sample of 10000. Some false alarms (actual faulty signals that are
estimated to be healthy signals) are also generated in some points.
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Figure 3.15: Multiple fault scenarios - scenario #3: residual error signal in the x-axis.
• Fourth scenario: In this scenario, a high temperature fault that results in 80%
increase in the nominal value of the viscous friction has occurred in the x-axis
of the satellite at the time sample of 5000 and then it is followed by a motor
current fault (60% drop in nominal value) in the x-axis of the satellite at the
time sample of 10000. The residual signal that is generated by the DNN in
the x-axis of the satellite is depicted in Fig. 3.16. When the temperature
fault occurs at the time sample of 5000, the residual signal passes the threshold
boundaries and becomes faulty. When the bus voltage fault occurs at the time
sample of 10000, the residual signal still stays out of the threshold boundaries
and indicates the reaction wheel to be faulty, but in some points the DNN fails
to detect the fault occurrence and the actual faulty residual signal is estimated
to be fault-free which generates some false alarms.
• Fifth scenario: In this scenario, a bus voltage fault (90% drop in nominal value)
has occurred in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000 and then
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Figure 3.16: Multiple fault scenarios - scenario #4: residual error signal in x-axis.
it is followed by a temperature fault (60% increase in nominal value of viscous
friction) in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 10000. Fig. 3.17
shows the residual signal generated by the DNN in the x-axis of the satellite.
This ﬁgure shows that when the bus voltage fault occurs at the time sample of
5000, the residual signal passes the threshold and indicates the fault occurrence.
When the temperature fault occurs at the time sample of 10000, the residual
signal still stays in faulty situation.
The results of fault detection for the above ﬁve fault scenarios are summarized in Table
3.1. This table shows that the fault detection system designed for a single satellite
has the capability of detecting bus volltage actuator faults without a signiﬁcant time
delay. The proposed single satellite FD system however fails to detect bus voltage
faults smaller than 50% drop in the nominal value. Table 3.2 summarizes the results
of the fault detection process for a single satellite under diﬀerent motor current fault
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Figure 3.17: Multiple fault scenarios - scenario #5: residual error signal in x-axis.
Table 3.1: Summary of the bus voltage fault detection results for a single satellite.
Faulty Fault Fault Injection Detection Time
Axis Type Severity Time x y z
x Bus Voltage 80% 5000 5000 - -
y Bus Voltage 60% 5000 - 5000 -
z Bus Voltage 50% 5000 - - 5000
x Bus Voltage 40% 5000 - - -
y Bus Voltage 30% 5000 - - -
z Bus Voltage 20% 5000 - - -
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Table 3.2: Summary of the motor current fault detection results for a single satellite.
Faulty Fault Fault Injection Detection Time
Axis Type Severity Time x y z
x Motor Current 60% 5000 5000 - -
y Motor Current 50% 5000 - 5000 -
z Motor Current 70% 5000 - - 5000
x Motor Current 40% 5000 - - -
y Motor Current 30% 5000 - - -
z Motor Current 20% 5000 - - -
Table 3.3: Summary of the temperature fault detection results for a single satellite.
Faulty Fault Fault Injection Detection Time
Axis Type Severity Time x y z
x Viscous Temperature 50% 5000 5000 - -
y Viscous Temperature 60% 5000 - 5000 -
z Viscous Temperature 70% 5000 - - 5000
x Viscous Temperature 40% 5000 - - -
y Viscous Temperature 30% 5000 - - -
z Viscous Temperature 20% 5000 - - -
scenarios. Once a fault occurs in one axis of a single satellite, the dynamic neural
network along the faulty axis can detect the fault immediately. However, this method
fails to detect motor current faults smaller than a 50% drop of the nominal values.
The results of the fault detection process for temperature faults in the actuator of
a single satellite are summarized in Table 3.3. This table shows that by using the
fault detection system in a single satellite, the DNN located in the faulty axis of the
satellite can detect the faults without a signiﬁcant time delay, but the system fails to
detect temperature faults smaller than a 50% drop of the nominal values.
3.3 Confusion Matrix Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed FD scheme, we use the confusion matrix
method [85]. The structure of this matrix is shown below. The speciﬁc evaluation
terms are: Accuracy, True Healthy, False Healthy, True Faulty, False Faulty and
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A: Actual Faulty/Predicted Faulty
B: Actual Faulty/Predicted Healthy
C: Actual Healthy/ Predicted Faulty
D: Actual Healthy/ Predicted Healthy
Accuracy =
A+D























Table 3.4: Actual and Detection results in case of the ﬁrst multiple fault scenario.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 10000 samples 10000 samples 10190 samples 9810 samples
Table 3.5: Actual and Detection results in case of the second multiple fault scenario.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 10000 samples 10000 samples 10640 samples 9360 samples
3.3.1 Confusion Matrix Analysis for FD System of a Single
Satellite
In order to investigate the capabilities of the proposed FD system in the formation
ﬂying mission, various faulty scenarios have been considered. In the ﬁrst scenario, a
motor current fault (60% drop of nominal value) has occurred in the x-axis of the
satellite at the time sample of 5000 and then it is followed by a viscous friction fault
(60% increase in nominal value) in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of
10000. Table. 3.4 shows the actual healthy and actual faulty output signals and
the classiﬁcation that is obtained by using the FD scheme. In the second scenario
a motor current fault (60% drop of nominal value) has occurred in the x-axis of the
satellite at the time sample of 5000 and then it is followed by a bus voltage fault (60%
drop in nominal value) in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 10000. The
actual healthy and actual faulty output signals and the classiﬁcation that is obtained
by using the FD scheme are depicted in Table. 3.5. In the third scenario, a viscous
friction fault (70% increase in nominal value) has occurred in the x-axis of the satel-
lite at the time sample of 5000 and then at the time sample of 10000 a bus voltage
fault (70% drop in nominal value) has occured in the x-axis of the satellite at the time
sample of 10000. Table. 3.6 shows the actual healthy and actual faulty output signals
and the classiﬁcation results that are obtained by using the proposed FD scheme. In
the fourth scenario, ﬁrst a viscous friction fault (80% increase in nominal value) has
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Table 3.6: Actual and Detection results in case of the third multiple fault scenario.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 10000 samples 10000 samples 9910 samples 10090 samples
Table 3.7: Actual and Detection results in case of the fourth multiple fault scenario.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 10000 samples 10000 samples 10300 samples 9700 samples
occurred in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000 and then a motor
current fault (60% drop in nominal value) has occured in the x-axis of the satellite at
the time sample of 10000. The actual healthy and actual faulty output signals and
the classiﬁcation results that are obtained by using the proposed DNNs is provided
in Table. 3.7. In the ﬁfth scenario, ﬁrst a bus voltage fault (90% drop in nominal
value) has occurred in the x-axis of the satellite at the time sample of 5000 and then
at the time sample of 10000 a temperature fault that results in a 60% increase in the
nominal value of the viscous friction has occured in the x-axis of the satellite. Table.
3.8 shows the actual healthy and actual faulty output signals and the fault detection
results that are obtained by using the proposed DNNs.
According to Tables. 3.4 to 3.8 the confusion matrix parameters depicted in
Table 3.9 are obtained for a single satellite. The results obtained from the confusion
matrix is depicted in Table 3.10. According to Table 3.10 dynamic neural network
located in faulty axis of the faulty spacecraft can classify 99% of healthy signals and
98% of faulty signals successfully. The accuracy level (98%) and the precision level
(97%) of this method are highly acceptable.
Using the dynamic neural network that is developed for a single satellite, bus
Table 3.8: Actual and Detection results in case of the ﬁfth multiple fault scenario.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 10000 samples 10000 samples 9920 samples 10080 samples
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Table 3.9: Confusion matrix parameters for a single satellite.
DNN # A B C D
DNN x-1 48870 samples 1130 samples 170 samples 50000 samples







voltage faults greater than 50% drop of nominal values, motor current faults greater
than 50% drop of nominal values and temperature faults greater than 60% drop of
nominal values can be detected in a single satellite. The proposed fault detection
system may fail to detect the presence of low severity faults. In an individual op-
erating satellite these low severity faults may not cause any serious diﬃculties with
the speciﬁcations of the overall mission, however they can cause signiﬁcant impact on
the satellite’s attitude or rates in a given precision formation ﬂight of a network of
satellites. Consequently, in order to detect these low severity faults a novel fault de-
tection system is required to be designed and developed for a formation of spacecraft.
The development and design of such a computationally intelligent-based scheme and
strategy are the main contributions of this thesis.
3.4 Problem Deﬁnition and Motivation for a For-
mation of Satellites
In the previous section the capabilities of a dynamic neural network-based fault de-
tection method for a single satellite that is proposed in [43] is investigated through
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various single and multiple fault scenarios. It is shown that the proposed single satel-
lite fault detection method has the capability of detecting major actuator faults in a
single satellite, but it fails to detect low severity faults in the actuators of a satellites.
These low severity faults usually do not cause any serious problem in a single satellite
space missions, but in a formation ﬂying mission, they may aﬀect the attitude of a
satellite and even result in serious damage in the formation.
On the other hand, in single satellite fault diagnosis methods in the literature,
each satellite can only detect the actuator faults of itself, therefore, if the local fault
diagnosis system fails, there is no way to detect the fault. In order to increase the re-
liability of the fault diagnosis system in a formation ﬂying of satellites it is important
to propose a decentralized fault diagnosis system, by which a fault in one satellite
can be also detected by its neighboring satellites.
One of the main contributions of this thesis is to propose a decentralized fault
detection methodology that can detect both high severity and low severity faults in a
formation ﬂying of satellites. In this thesis, two fault detection schemes are studied.
In the ﬁrst scheme, the data exchange and communication links are assumed to be
unidirectional, implying that the DNNs in the fault diagnosis system in each satellite
use the relative attitude measurements of that satellite with respect to its adjacent
satellites. In the second scheme, the data exchange and communication links are
bidirectional, implying that the DNNs in the fault diagnosis system in each satellite
uses the relative attitude of that satellite with respect to its two adjacent neighbors.
The capabilities of these two schemes are studied in this chapter and it is shown
that although the second scheme requires more data exchange, but it has the ability
to detect faults with shorter time delays and it can improve the precision and the
accuracy performance merits.
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3.5 Fault Detection System for Formation of Satel-
lites - First Scheme
The schematic representation of the proposed fault detection (FD) system based on
the formation ﬂying relative attitudes is depicted in Fig. 3.19. In this scheme, one
dynamic neural network is located in each axis of a spacecraft. A three level system is
shown in this ﬁgure, namely: attitude control subsystem (ACS) of the i-th satellite,
attitude control subsystem (ACS) of the (i + 1)-th satellite, and the FD scheme for
the x-axis of of the i-th satellite. In this chapter, a four spacecraft formation ﬂying
mission is studied and in the ﬁrst scheme it is assumed that each satellite receives
attitude information from its adjacent neighbor, i.e. the (i + 1)-th satellite. The
data communication ﬂow among the satellites in this mission are depicted in Fig.







T represents the attitude vector of the i-th satellite.
Each dynamic neural network is trained based on set of input/output data that are
collected from the relative attitude determination sensors of the 3-axis attitude control








command] is used as
an input vector for the training the dynamic neural network and y = [τ ireaction] is used




2 , and q
i+1/i
3 are relative
attitude of the i-th satellite with respect to the (i+1)-th satellite and V icommand denotes
the commanded voltage of the i-th satellite and τ ireaction denotes the reaction torque
of the i-th satellite.
3.6 Training Phase
The training phase is carried out by using an extended dynamic back-propagation
method for about 50000 time samples for each axis and each time sample is equal
to 0.01 seconds. All the input and output vectors are normalized in the range [-1
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Figure 3.18: Communication links among the four spacecraft in the formation - ﬁrst
scheme.
Figure 3.19: Structure of the fault detection (FD) system in a formation ﬂying of
satellites - ﬁrst scheme.
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+1]. Table 3.11 shows the dynamic neural network parameters for the FD system in
each spacecraft of the formation where n is the number of hidden layers, N1 is the
number of neurons in the ﬁrst hidden layer and η is the learning rate. The dynamic
neural networks are trained until a termination criterion is satisﬁed. In this sec-
tion, the termination criterion that is used is the mean squared error (mse) criterion.
Adaption laws are based on the steepest descent gradient method and conventional
back-propagation learning law. The parameters are updated so that the norm of the






(yk(t)− ydesiredk (t))2 (3.9)
The training process is accomplished by using the Monte Carlo simulations un-
der diﬀerent noisy conditions for 50000 samples and each sample is 0.001 seconds.
The network is trained for 100 diﬀerent pairs of input/output data in presence of a
normally distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences
between the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output data intervals.
The performance of the network during the training phase along the x-axis of the
four satellite in the formation is shown in Fig. 3.20. The mean square error (mse) for
the other axes of other satellites are obtained in a similar way. The average value of
the mean square error in 100 training simulations is 0.058 and its standard deviation
is 0.0008, which is quite acceptable.
3.7 Testing Phase
The representation capability of the trained networks is evaluated through general-




Figure 3.20: The performance index (mean squared error of the output reaction
torque) curve for the dynamic neural network- x-axis of (a) satellite #1, (b) satellite
#2 (c) satellite #3 (d) satellite #4.
Table 3.11: DNN characteristics in the learning phase.
Spacecraft # Network Size Number of Performance Learning
Iterations Index Rate
1 N1−10−1 50000 0.011 0.05
2 N1−8−1 50000 0.035 0.01
3 N1−8−1 50000 0.067 0.01
4 N1−6−1 50000 0.0273 0.03
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reaction wheel and the neural network output in the testing phase for the three axes
of the satellites #1 in the formation. This ﬁgure shows that the output of the trained
dynamic neural network follows the actual output of the system quite closely; there-
fore it has the capability of detecting faults and deviations in the input signal.
The testing phase is accomplished for 100 diﬀerent pairs of input/output data in
presence of a normally distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of
0.01 diﬀerences between the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output
data intervals. The average value of the mean square error in 100 testing samples is
0.08 and its standard deviation is 0.001, which is quite acceptable. The testing curves
for other axes of each satellite can be obtained similarly.
3.8 Fault Detection Threshold Determination
After training and testing the dynamic neural networks by using healthy input/output
data set, this network can now be used for generating residual signals. In this step,
the output of the neural network is compared with the actual output of the reaction
wheel and their diﬀerences are considered as the residual signals. The residual signal
has to be compared with a predeﬁned threshold value to determine the health status
of the system. If the residual signal exceeds the threshold value, this implies that
a fault has happened in the corresponding axis of the satellite. The residual signals
that are collected during various fault free formation ﬂying missions can be used to
determine the thresholds. The mean values of generated residual signals (X¯) and their
standard deviation (σ) are calculated, and the threshold values can be calculated by
using the following formula:




Figure 3.21: Testing curve (actual and estimated outputs) for the DNN - (a) x-axis,
(b) y-axis, and (c) z-axis of the satellite #1.
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3.9 Actuator Fault Scenarios
In this chapter, the following formation ﬂight mission is simulated. Four satellites
having bi-directional ring topology are controlled by using consensus-based virtual
structure controller that is proposed in [16] are considered. These four satellites
are located on a plane and distributed equally along a circle with diameter of 0.7
kilometer. It is assumed that the four spacecraft formation evolves as a rigid body and
the formation shape is preserved, and in the healthy situation each satellite preserves
a ﬁxed relative orientation within the formation throughout the maneuvers. Diﬀerent
types of faulty scenarios under worst case noisy conditions are considered and have
been injected to the closed-loop attitude controlled system in each satellite’s axis.
The process of fault detection can be accomplished by using the simple threshold
technique described in previous section. Any deviation from the threshold ranges
will be considered as a fault. The thresholds are selected after performing diﬀerent
simulations under diﬀerent operating conditions to make sure that the proposed fault
detection technique will work successfully with minimum false alarms. the types of
actuator faults considered are as follows:
• Bus voltage (VBUS) fault
In order to investigate the capabilities of the proposed DNNs in formation ﬂying
of satellites missions, the following bus voltage fault scenarios are considered:
– First scenario: In this case, a low bus voltage (70% drop from the nominal
value) fault is injected in the x-axis of the satellite #2 at the time sample
of 5000. Fig. 3.22 shows the residual signal that is generated in the x-axis
of the satellite #2 and the satellite #1 (its neighbor). This ﬁgure clearly
shows that the proposed dynamic neural network along the x-axis of the
satellite #2 and the DNN along the x-axis of the satellite #1 can detect
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the fault successfully.
– Second scenario: In this scenario, a low bus voltage (45% drop from the
nominal value) fault has occured in the z-axis of the satellite #2 at the
time sample of 10000. The residual signals that are generated along z-axis
of the satellite #2 and the satellite #1 (its neighbor) are shown in Fig.
3.23. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed dynamic neural network
along z-axis of satellite #2 and the DNN along x-axis of satellite #1 are
capable of detecting the fault successfully.
• Motor current (Im) fault
In order to evaluate the capabilities of the trained DNNs in formation ﬂying of
satellites, the following motor current fault scenarios are considered:
– First scenario: In this case, a low motor current (50% drop of nominal
value) fault is injected in the x-axis of satellite #3 at the time sample of
10000. Fig. 3.24 shows the residual signals that are generated along the
x-axis of the satellite #3 and the satellite #2 (its neighbor). This ﬁgure
clearly shows that the proposed dynamic neural network along the x-axis
of the satellite #3 and the DNN along the x-axis of the satellite #2 can
detect the fault successfully.
– Second scenario: In the second scenario, a 80% drop from the nominal
value of motor current fault has occured in the x-axis of the satellite #4 at
the time sample of 10000. The output of DNN-based residual generators
is shown in Fig. 3.25 for the x-axis of the satellite #4 and the satellite #3
(its neighbor). This ﬁgure shows that the fault occurrence can be detected
by using the proposed dynamic neural network along the x-axis of the




Figure 3.22: Residual signals corresponding to bus voltage fault - scenario 1: (a)




Figure 3.23: Residual signals corresponding to bus voltage fault - scenario 2: (a)




Figure 3.24: Residual signals corresponding to motor current fault - scenario 1: (a)
x-axis satellite #3, (b) x-axis satellite #2.
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• Viscous temperature (τv) fault
The capabilities of the trained DNNs in detecting actuator faults in the forma-
tion ﬂying of satellites is investigated through the following viscous temperature
fault scenarios:
– First scenario: In this case, a temperature fault that results in a 50%
increase in the nominal value of the viscous friction is injected in the x-
axis of the satellite #2 at the time sample of 5000. Fig. 3.26 shows the
residual signals that are generated along x-axis of the satellite #2 and
satellite #1 (its neighbor). This ﬁgure clearly shows that by using the
proposed dynamic neural network along the x-axis of the satellite #2 and
the DNN along x-axis of satellite #1 are capable of detecting the fault
successfully.
– Second scenario: In this case, a 50% increase in nominal value of viscous
friction fault has occured in the x-axis of the satellite #1 at the time
sample of 10000. The residual signal that is generated along x-axis of the
satellite #1 and the satellite #4 (its neighbor) is shown in Fig. 3.27. This
ﬁgure clearly shows that by using the proposed fault detection scheme, the
DNNs located along x-axis of satellite #1 and the x-axis of the satellite
#4 can see the eﬀect of fault clearly.
The ability of the proposed method for detecting faults is evaluated in diﬀerent fault
scenarios. Once a fault occurs in the i-th satellite, the fault detection system in
satellite #i can detect it immediately and the FD system in satellite #(i − 1) can
detect the fault with a time delay. Therefore, the ﬁrst advantage of the proposed




Figure 3.25: Residual signals corresponding to motor current fault - scenario 2: (a)




Figure 3.26: Residual signals corresponding to temperature fault - scenario 1: (a)




Figure 3.27: Residual signals corresponding to temperature fault - scenario 2: (a)
x-axis satellite #1, (b) x-axis satellite #4.
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detected by using local diagnoser immediately and then, after a time delay, the fault
can be detected by using DNNs that are embedded in the nearest neighbor of the
faulty satellite. When the severity of fault increases, even the next neighbor (satellite
#(i − 2)) can detect the fault after longer time delay too. Tables 3.12-3.15 show
the capabilities of the formation ﬂying FD system in detecting faults under diﬀerent
faulty conditions.
In Table 3.12 a 60% drop of nominal value of the bus voltage fault along the x-
axis of the satellite #1 is considered. According to this table, once this fault occurs
along the x-axis of satellite #1, the DNN embedded along the x-axis of the satellite
#1 can detect the fault immediately, and the DNNs embedded along other axes of
satellite #1 can detect the fault after a short time delay (approximately 5 seconds).
The attitude information of satellite #1 is transmitted to its adjacent neighbor (i.e.
satellite #4). Once a fault occurs in satellite #1 it aﬀects the attitude of satellite #4
and satellite #3. Since the DNNs embedded in satellite #4 are trained based on the
relative attitude of satellite #4 with respect to satellite #1, the DNNs embedded in
satellite #4 and satellite #3 can detect the fault after a time delay. Since satellite #4
is the closest satellite to satellite #1 in the formation (as far as communication delay),
the DNNs in satellite #4 detect the fault in a shorter time delay and since satellite #2
is the farthest satellite from satellite #1 in the formation (as far as communication
delay), the DNNs in satellite #2 cannot detect the fault that has occured in satellite
#1.
Fault detection time delays in a faulty scenario in which 50% drop of nominal
value of the motor current along the x-axis of satellite #2 faulty is happened is
depicted in Table 3.13. Once the fault happens along the x-axis of satellite #2, the
DNN along the x-axis of satellite #2 can detect the fault immediately and the DNNs
along the y and z-axes of satellite #2 can detect the fault after a short time delay.
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Table 3.12: Fault detection time delays in case of 60% drop of nominal value in the
bus voltage of x-axis satellite #1.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 0 sec
DNN y-1 YES 5 sec
DNN z-1 YES 5 sec
DNN x-2 NO -
DNN y-2 NO -
DNN z-2 NO -
DNN x-3 YES 15 sec
DNN y-3 YES 17 sec
DNN z-3 YES 15 sec
DNN x-4 YES 11 sec
DNN y-4 YES 7 sec
DNN z-4 YES 8 sec
Table 3.13: Fault detection time delays in case of 50% drop of nominal values in the
motor current of x-axis satellite #2.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 13 sec
DNN y-1 YES 10 sec
DNN z-1 YES 10 sec
DNN x-2 YES 0 sec
DNN y-2 YES 6 sec
DNN z-2 YES 2 sec
DNN x-3 NO -
DNN y-3 NO -
DNN z-3 NO -
DNN x-4 YES 15 sec
DNN y-4 YES 20 sec
DNN z-4 YES 15 sec
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Table 3.14: Fault detection time delays in case of 10% increase in nominal values of
the viscous friction of y-axis satellite #3.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 NO -
DNN y-1 NO -
DNN z-1 NO -
DNN x-2 YES 14 sec
DNN y-2 YES 16 sec
DNN z-2 YES 14 sec
DNN x-3 YES 7 sec
DNN y-3 YES 0 sec
DNN z-3 YES 8 sec
DNN x-4 NO -
DNN y-4 NO -
DNN z-4 NO -
DNNs in satellite #1 and satellite #4 can also detect the eﬀects of this fault after
longer time delays. Since satellite #3 is the farthest satellite from satellite #2 in the
formation, the attitude deviations in the satellite #1 cannot aﬀect the attitude of
satellite #3, and the DNNs in satellite #3 fail to detect the fault.
A low severity viscous friction fault (10% increase from the nominal value along
the y-axis of satellite #3) detection results are shown in Table 3.14. According to this
table, once a fault is injected along the y-axis of satellite #3, the DNN embedded along
y-axis of satellite #3 can detect the fault immediately, and then the fault is detected
by DNNs along the x and z-axes of satellite #3. The closest agent to the satellite #3
in the formation is satellite #2. Therefore, the attitude deviations in satellite #3 will
aﬀect the orientation of satellite #2 as well, hence the DNNs embedded in satellite
#2 can detect the fault after a time delay. In this case the severity of temperature
fault is very low (10% increase from the nominal value), therefore, this fault aﬀects
the attitude of satellite#3 (and satellite #2 consequently) slightly. However it has
no eﬀect on orientation of satellite #1 in the formation. Therefore only DNNs in
satellite #3 and satellite #2 can detect the fault. In Table 3.15, the severity of the
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Table 3.15: Fault detection time delays in case of 50% increase in nominal value of
the viscous friction of y-axis satellite #3.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 20 sec
DNN y-1 YES 14 sec
DNN z-1 YES 20 sec
DNN x-2 YES 10 sec
DNN y-2 YES 10 sec
DNN z-2 YES 10 sec
DNN x-3 YES 5 sec
DNN y-3 YES 0 sec
DNN z-3 YES 5 sec
DNN x-4 NO -
DNN y-4 NO -
DNN z-4 NO -
fault is increased (50% increase from the nominal value of viscous temperature along
the y-axis of satellite #3), and therefore it aﬀects the attitude of satellite #1 as well,
so that the DNNs embedded in satellite #1 can also detect the fault.
3.10 Actuator Multiple Fault Scenarios
In this section in order to evaluate the capability of the proposed FD scheme in
detecting multiple faults in a formation ﬂying of spacecraft, diﬀerent faulty scenarios
are considered.
• Multiple faults in diﬀerent axes of a spacecraft
– First scenario: In this scenario, a 20% increase in nominal viscous friction
(τv) fault occurs in the x-axis of satellite #2 at the time sample of 5000,
and a low motor current (Im) fault (10% drop from the nominal value)
is injected in the y-axis of satellite #2 at the time sample of 10000. Fig.
3.28 shows the residual signals that are generated along (a) x-axis of the
satellite #2 and (b) y-axis of satellite #2 by using the proposed FD system
110
for formation ﬂying. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed formation
ﬂying dynamic neural network along the x-axis of satellite #2 can detect
the viscous friction fault immediately at the time sample of 5000, and
when the motor current fault occurs at the time sample of 10000, the
output signal still remains above the threshold value. The DNN along the
y-axis of satellite detects the temperature fault in the x-axis after a short
time delay, and when the current fault occurs in the y-axis another jump
happens in the residual signal curve at the time sample of 10000.
– Second scenario: In this scenario, a bus voltage (VBUS) fault (50% drop
from the nominal value) has occured along the z-axis in satellite #3 at
the time sample of 5000, and it is followed by a low motor current (Im)
fault (50% drop from the nominal value) in the y-axis of satellite #3 at
the time sample of 10000. Fig. 3.29 shows the residual signals that are
generated along (a) z-axis of the satellite #3 and (b) y-axis of satellite #3
using the proposed formation ﬂying FD system. This ﬁgure clearly shows
that when a bus voltage fault occurs in z-axis of satellite #3, the residual
signal generated in corresponding axis detects the fault immediately at
time samples 5000. Also, the dynamic neural network along y-axis of
satellite #3 can see the eﬀect of fault in z-axis after a short time delay.
When a motor current fault occurs in y-axis of satellite #3, another jump
happens in output signal of satellite #3 at time samples 10000, and it still
remains in faulty zone.
– Third scenario: In this scenario, ﬁrst a low motor current (Im) fault (10%
drop of nominal value) is injected in the x-axis of the satellite #1 at the
time sample of 5000, and then a 10% increase of nominal viscous friction




Figure 3.28: Residual signals corresponding to multiple fault scenario 1: (a) along




Figure 3.29: Residual signals corresponding to multiple fault scenario 2: (a) along
the z-axis of satellite #3 (b) along the y-axis of satellite #3.
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10000. The residual signals that are generated along (a) x-axis of the satel-
lite #1 and (b) y-axis of satellite #1 using the proposed formation ﬂying
FD system are shown in Fig. 3.30. This ﬁgure shows that when the motor
current fault occurs along the x-axis of satellite #1 it can be detected im-
mediately using the corresponding DNN at time samples 5000. The DNN
that is embedded along y-axis of satellite #1 can detect the motor current
fault after a considerable time delay and when the temperature fault oc-
curs in y-axis of satellite #1 at the time sample of 10000, a jump occurs
in the residual error signal and the fault can be detected immediately.
• Multiple faults in two separate spacecraft
• Fourth scenario: In this scenario, a low motor current (Im) fault (50% drop of
nominal value) is injected in the y-axis of satellite #2 at the time sample of
5000, and it is followed by another low motor current (Im) fault (50% drop of
nominal value) that is injected in the z-axis of satellite #4 at the time sample
of 10000. Fig. 3.31 shows the residual signals that are generated along (a) the
y-axis of the satellite #2 and (b) the z-axis of satellite #4 using the proposed
formation ﬂying FD system. This ﬁgure shows that the fault occurrence along
y-axis of satellite #2 can be detected without a signiﬁcant time delay using the
corresponding DNN at the time sample of 5000. The DNN along the z-axis of
satellite #4 can detect the motor current fault after a time delay and when the
next motor current fault occurs in the z-axis of satellite #4 at the time sample
of 10000, a jump occurs in the residual error signal and the fault is detected
immediately.
• Fifth scenario: In this scenario, a low bus voltage (VBUS) fault (50% drop of




Figure 3.30: Residual signals corresponding to multiple fault scenario 3: (a) along




Figure 3.31: Residual signals corresponding to multiple fault scenario 4: (a) along
the y-axis of satellite #2 (b) along the z-axis of satellite #4.
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and then at the time sample of 10000 a low motor current (Im) fault (50% drop
from the nominal value) has occured in the z-axis of satellite #3. The residual
signals that are generated using the proposed formation ﬂying FD system along
(a) the y-axis of the satellite #1 and (b) the z-axis of satellite #3 are shown
in Fig. 3.32. This ﬁgure shows that when a bus voltage fault happens in the
y-axis of satellite #1, the corresponding DNN along the y-axis of satellite #1
can detect the fault immediately at the time sample of 5000. When the motor
current fault occurs in the z-axis of satellite #3, the residual signal in the y-axis
of satellite #1 still remains faulty. The DNN in the z-axis of satellite #3 detects
the bus voltage fault in satellite #1 after a time delay and when the second fault
happens in the z-axis of satellite #3 at time samples 10000, a jump happens in
the residual error signal and the error signal still remains in the faulty zone.
• Sixth scenario: In this case, a low bus voltage (VBUS) fault (45% drop of nominal
value) is injected in the y-axis of satellite #4 at the time sample of 5000, and
then it is followed by another bus voltage (VBUS) fault (50% drop of nominal
value) in the z-axis of satellite #2 at the time sample of 10000. Fig. 3.33
shows the residual signals that are generated along (a) the y-axis of the satellite
#4 and (b) the z-axis of satellite #2 using the proposed formation ﬂying fault
detection system. Using the proposed method, a bus voltage fault in the y-axis
of the satellite #4, can be detected by using the corresponding DNN along the
y-axis of satellite #4 at time samples 5000 (without time delay). When the
next bus voltage fault occurs in the z-axis of satellite #2, the residual signal in
the y-axis of satellite #4 still remains faulty. The DNN in the z-axis of satellite
#2 detects the bus voltage fault in satellite #4 after a time delay and when
the second fault happens in the z-axis of satellite #2 at the time sample of




Figure 3.32: Residual signals corresponding to multiple fault scenario 5: (a) along
the y-axis of satellite #1 (b) along the z-axis of satellite #4.
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the threshold boundaries and indicates the faulty situation.
3.11 Fault Detection in Case of Low Severity Faults
Another motivation for developing the formation ﬂying FD system is that it has the
capability of detecting low severity faults when the local FD systems can not ac-
complish this goal. In order to evaluate capability of the proposed formation ﬂying
DNN-based scheme in detecting low severity faults, various faulty scenarios are con-
sidered and the capability of the formation ﬂying FD system in detecting low severity
faults is compared with the single satellite FD system that is previously developed
in [43].
• First scenario: In this case, a bus voltage fault (45% drop from the nominal
value) is injected in the z-axis of satellite #2 at the time sample of 10000. Fig.
3.34 shows the residual signals that are generated along the z-axis of satellite
#2 using (a) formation ﬂying FD system, and (b) single satellite FD system.
This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed formation ﬂying dynamic neural
network along the z-axis of satellite #2 can detect the fault immediately, while
the single satellite DNN along the z-axis of satellite #2 fails to detect the fault.
• Second scenario: In this case, a low motor current (5% drop from the nominal
value) fault has occured in the y-axis of satellite #3 at the time sample of
10000. The residual signals that are generated along the y-axis of satellite #3
using (a) formation ﬂying FD system, and (b) single satellite FD system are
shown in Fig. 3.35. This ﬁgure clearly shows that by using the proposed DNN-




Figure 3.33: Residual signals corresponding to multiple fault scenario 6: (a) along




Figure 3.34: Residual error signals corresponding to low severity faults along the
z-axis of satellite #2, scenario 1: (a) formation ﬂying (b) single satellite.
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Table 3.16: Comparison between single satellite and formation ﬂying FD systems.
Single satellite FD system Formation ﬂying FD system
Bus Voltage Fault ≥ 50% drop from the ≥ 45% drop from the
nominal value nominal value
Motor Current Fault ≥ 50% drop from the ≥ 5% drop from the
nominal value nominal value
Viscous Friction Fault ≥ 50% drop from the ≥ 5% drop from the
nominal value nominal value
#3 can be detected immediately, while the local DNN in the y-axis of satellite
#3 cannot detect the fault.
• Third scenario: In this scenario, a temperature fault that results in a 5% increase
in viscous friction of the reaction wheel is injected in the x-axis of satellite #1
at the time sample of 10000. Fig. 3.36 shows the residual signals that are
generated along the y-axis of satellite #3 using (a) formation ﬂying FD system,
and (b) single satellite FD system. This ﬁgure clearly shows that the proposed
formation ﬂying dynamic neural network along the y-axis of satellite #3 can
detect the fault without a signiﬁcant time delay, while the single satellite DNN
along the y-axis of satellite #3 fails to detect the fault occurence.
The second advantage of the formation ﬂying FD system that is proposed in this
thesis, compared to the single satellite FD system approach that is proposed in [43]
is its ability to detect low severity faults. Using this scheme, bus voltage faults
greater than 45% drop from the nominal values and temperature and motor current
faults greater than 5% drop from the nominal values can be detected. A qualitative
comparison between the single satellite and the formation ﬂying DNN-based fault




Figure 3.35: Residual error signals corresponding to low severity faults along the




Figure 3.36: Residual error signals corresponding to low severity faults along the
x-axis of satellite #1, scenario 3: (a) formation ﬂying (b) single satellite.
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3.12 FD System for a Formation of Satellites - Sec-
ond Scheme
In the second scheme, a consensus-based virtual structure controlled formation ﬂight
having bi-directional ring topology is considered. In this architecture each satellite
receives information from its two adjacent neighbors. The formation ﬂying dynamic
neural network-based FD system is trained based on sets of input/output data that are
collected from the relative attitude determination sensors of the 3-axis attitude control














T is used as input vector for training the dynamic neural network and y =














3 are the relative attitude of satellite #i with respect to
satellite #(i − 1) and V icommand denotes the commanded voltage of satellite #i and
τ ireaction denotes the reaction torque of satellite #i.
Fig. 3.37 shows the bi-directional connection links among four satellites in the for-
mation ﬂight scenario and Fig. 3.38 shows the proposed formation ﬂying FD scheme.
3.13 Training Phase
Similar to the previous scheme, the DNNs in this scheme are trained by using an
extended dynamic back-propagation method. The training phase is carried out for
50000 time samples and each time sample is equal to 0.01 sec. The input/output data
set is normalized into the range of [-1,+1]. Table 3.17 shows the network parameters
for which the best network performance is obtained. In this table n is the number
of hidden layers, N1 is the number of neurons in the ﬁrst hidden layer and η is the
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Figure 3.37: Communication links among the spacecraft in the formation - second
scheme.
learning rate. The dynamic neural networks are trained until a termination criterion
is satisﬁed. In this section, the termination criterion is the mean squared error (mse)
criterion. Similar to the ﬁrst scheme, in this approach, the adaption laws are based on
the steepest descent gradient method and extended back-propagation learning law.
The network parameters are updated so that the norm of the identiﬁcation error is






(yk(t)− ydesiredk (t))2 (3.11)
The training process is accomplished by using the Monte Carlo simulations under
diﬀerent noisy situations for 50000 time samples and each time sample is 0.001 sec.
The network is trained for 100 diﬀerent pairs of input/output data in presence of a
normally distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences
between the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output data intervals.
The performance of network during the training phase along the x-axis of the four
satellites is shown in Fig. 3.39. The average value of the mean square error in
100 training simulations is 0.046 and its standard deviation is 0.0006, which is quite
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Figure 3.38: Structure of the FD system in a formation ﬂying of satellites - second
scheme.
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Table 3.17: DNN characteristics in the learning phase.
Spacecraft # Network Size Number of Performance Learning Rate
Iterations Index Rate
1 N1−5−1 50000 0.047 0.01
2 N1−5−1 50000 0.062 0.02
3 N1−6−1 50000 0.0547 0.01
4 N1−6−1 50000 0.0483 0.01
acceptable. The mean square error (mse) for other axes of other satellites can be
obtained in a similar way.
3.14 Testing Phase
In order to evaluate the capability of the trained DNNs in representing dynamic model
of the reaction wheels of a spacecraft, the output of the neural network is obtained
for another healthy input data set and it is compared with the actual output of the
system. Fig. 3.40 shows the estimated output and the actual output of the system
in the testing phase for the three axes of the satellite #1 in the formation. This
ﬁgure shows that the output of the trained dynamic neural network can follow the
actual output of the system. The testing step is accomplished for 100 diﬀerent pairs
of input/output data in presence of a normally distributed noise with zero mean
and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences between the maximum and the minimum
values in the input/output data intervals. The average value of mean square error





Figure 3.39: The performance index (mean squared error of the output reaction
torque) curve for the dynamic neural network- x-axis of (a) satellite #1, (b) satellite




Figure 3.40: Testing curve (actual and estimated outputs) for the DNN (second
approach) - (a) x-axis, (b) y-axis, (c) z-axis of satellite #1.
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3.15 Actuator Fault Scenarios
In order to evaluate the representation characteristics of the proposed DNN-based
method FD scheme, several fault scenarios are considered as described below.
• Bus voltage (VBUS) fault
– First scenario: In this scenario, a low bus voltage (60% drop from the
nominal value) fault is injected in the x-axis of satellite #4 at the time
sample of 5000. Fig. 3.41 shows the residual signal generated in local
fault diagnosis DNN and in the corresponding DNNs in its two adjacent
neighbors.
– Second scenario: In the second scenario, a low bus voltage (45% drop from
the nominal value) fault has occurred in the z-axis of satellite #2 at the
time sample of 10000. The residual error signals generated in the z-axis of
satellite #2 and the corresponding axes of its two adjacent satellites are
shown in Fig. 3.42.
• Motor Current (Im) Fault
– Third scenario: In this case, a low motor current (15% drop of nominal
value) fault is injected at the y-axis of satellite #3 at the time sample of
10000. The residual error signals on the y-axis network of satellites #3,
#2 and #4 are shown in Fig. 3.43.
– Forth scenario: In this scenario, a low motor current (60% drop from
the nominal value) fault is injected in the x-axis of satellite #1 at the
time sample of 5000. Fig. 3.44 shows the residual error signals that are
generated in the x-axis of satellite #1, #2 and #4. In this case, when





Figure 3.41: Residual signals corresponding to bus voltage fault - scenario 1: (a)





Figure 3.42: Residual signals corresponding to bus voltage fault - scenario 2: (a)





Figure 3.43: Residual signals corresponding to motor current fault - scenario 3: (a)
y-axis of satellite #3, (b) y-axis of satellite #2, (c) y-axis of satellite #4.
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signal generated in the x-axis of satellite #1 detects the fault immediately
and the residual error signal exceeds the threshold at the time sample of
5000. In this case a misclassiﬁcation has occured at the time sample of
9000. Although the system is still faulty, the residual error crosses the
healthy zone at the time sample of 9000 for a short period of time. In
Section 3.16 these residual error are classiﬁed as ”Actual faulty/Predicted
Healthy” signals.
• Viscous Temperature (τv) Fault
– Fifth scenario: In this case, a high viscous temperature (50% increase from
the nominal value) fault is injected at the x-axis of satellite #2 at the time
sample of 5000. The residual error signals on the x-axis dynamic neural
network of satellite #2, #3 and #1 are shown in Fig. 3.45.
– Sixth scenario: In this case a high temperature fault that results in a
10% increase from the nominal value of viscous friction has occured at
the x-axis of satellite #1 at the time sample of 10000. The residual error
signals on the x-axis networks of satellites #1, #2 and #4 are shown in
Fig. 3.46. In this case a misclassiﬁcation has occured at the time sample
of 11500. Although the system is still faulty, the residual error signal
crosses the healthy zone at the time sample of 11500 for a short period of
time. In Section 3.16 these residual error signals are classiﬁed as ”Actual
faulty/Predicted Healthy” signals.
Figs. 3.41 to 3.46 show that once a fault occurs in a reaction wheel of one of the
satellites in the formation, it can be detected by using local DNN immediately. DNNs
in the corresponding axes of the two adjacent neighbors of the faulty spacecraft can





Figure 3.44: Residual signals corresponding to motor current fault - scenario 4: (a)





Figure 3.45: Residual signals corresponding to temperature fault - scenario 5: (a)





Figure 3.46: Residual signals corresponding to temperature fault - scenario 6: (a)
x-axis of satellite #1, (b) x-axis of satellite #4, (c) x-axis of satellite #2.
138
In this scheme, once a fault occurs in satellite #i, it can be detected by local
diagnoser immediately. However, since there are communication links between each
satellite and its two nearest neighbors, the DNN based FD systems that are embedded
in two adjacent nearest neighbors of satellite #i (i.e. satellite #(i − 1) and satellite
#(i + 1)) can detect the fault occurrence after a short time delay too. However,
depending on the fault severity, the second nearest neighbors of satellite #i might be
able to detect the fault after longer time delays. Similar to the ﬁrst scheme, in this
scheme the bus voltage faults greater than 45% drop from the nominal value, motor
current faults greater than 5% drop from the nominal value and viscous temperature
faults greater than 5% drop from the nominal value can be detected successfully.
In order to provide a quantitative study on fault detection time delays, diﬀerent
fault scenarios are considered. Table 3.18 shows the fault detection times for the
DNNs employed in the formation in case of a low bus voltage fault (60% drop from
the nominal value) along the x-axis of satellite #1. This table shows that the local
diagnoser (DNN x-1) can detect the fault immediately, while the DNNs in adjacent
neighbors can detect the fault after a short time delay.
In the second case, a low motor current fault (50% drop from the nominal
value) is injected in the reaction wheel of the x-axis of satellite #2. Table 3.19 shows
the fault detection times for the DNNs embedded in diﬀerent axes of spacecraft in
the formation. In this case fault is injected in the x-axis of satellite #2, so the
corresponding DNN in the x-axis of satellite #2 can detect the fault immediately,
and the DNNs in adjacent satellites can detect the fault after a time delay. Table
3.20 shows the fault detection times for a 10% increase in the nominal value of viscous
friction fault in the y-axis of satellite #3. In this case the DNN along the y-axis of
satellite #3 detects the fault without a signiﬁcant time delay and the other DNNs
detect the fault after a time delay. In the fourth scenario, a high temperature fault
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Table 3.18: Fault detection time delays in case of 60% drop of nominal value in the
bus voltage of x-axis satellite #1.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 0 sec
DNN y-1 YES 2 sec
DNN z-1 YES 1 sec
DNN x-2 YES 5 sec
DNN y-2 YES 5 sec
DNN z-2 YES 5 sec
DNN x-3 YES 1 sec
DNN y-3 YES 1 sec
DNN z-3 YES 1 sec
DNN x-4 YES 8 sec
DNN y-4 YES 6 sec
DNN z-4 YES 5 sec
Table 3.19: Fault detection time delays in case of 50% drop of nominal value in the
bus voltage of x-axis satellite #2.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 2 sec
DNN y-1 YES 4 sec
DNN z-1 YES 5 sec
DNN x-2 YES 0 sec
DNN y-2 YES 8 sec
DNN z-2 YES 5 sec
DNN x-3 YES 5 sec
DNN y-3 YES 5 sec
DNN z-3 YES 6 sec
DNN x-4 YES 15 sec
DNN y-4 YES 14 sec
DNN z-4 YES 15 sec
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Table 3.20: Fault detection time delays in case of 10% increase in nominal value of
the viscous friction of y-axis satellite #3.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 20 sec
DNN y-1 YES 15 sec
DNN z-1 YES 18 sec
DNN x-2 YES 11 sec
DNN y-2 YES 8 sec
DNN z-2 YES 10 sec
DNN x-3 YES 5 sec
DNN y-3 YES 0 sec
DNN z-3 YES 5 sec
DNN x-4 YES 12 sec
DNN y-4 YES 14 sec
DNN z-4 YES 12 sec
that results in a 50% increase from the nominal value of viscous friction is injected in
the reaction wheel of the y-axis of satellite #3. Table 3.21 shows the fault detection
times in the DNNs that are embedded in diﬀerent axes of spacecraft in the formation.
In this case fault is injected in the y-axis of satellite #3, so the corresponding DNN
in the y-axis of satellite #3 can detect the fault immediately, and the DNNs in the
neighboring satellites can detect the fault after a time delay.
A comparative study of Tables 3.12- 3.15 (i.e. fault detection times using the
ﬁrst fault detection scheme) and Tables 3.18- 3.21 (i.e. fault detection times using
the second fault detection scheme) shows that in the second fault detection scheme,
the neighboring spacecraft can detect the fault earlier than the neighboring satellite
in the ﬁrst scheme. That is due to the fact that the DNNs in the second scheme
are trained based on the attitude information obtained from two adjacent neighbors
of the faulty spacecraft and they can provide better estimate of the output of the
system.
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Table 3.21: Fault detection time delays in case of 50% increase in nominal value of
the viscous friction of y-axis satellite #3.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay
DNN x-1 YES 10 sec
DNN y-1 YES 9 sec
DNN z-1 YES 9 sec
DNN x-2 YES 6 sec
DNN y-2 YES 5 sec
DNN z-2 YES 6 sec
DNN x-3 YES 5 sec
DNN y-3 YES 0 sec
DNN z-3 YES 5 sec
DNN x-4 YES 10 sec
DNN y-4 YES 8 sec
DNN z-4 YES 10 sec
Table 3.22: Actual and detection results in case of 45% drop from the nominal value
of the bus voltage (VBUS) along the z-axis of satellite #2 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN z-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 4590 samples 5410 samples
DNN z-1 5000 samples 5000 samples 6400 samples 3600 samples
3.16 Confusion Matrix Analysis for Formation Fly-
ing FD Method
3.16.1 Confusion Matrix - Formation Flying FD - First Scheme
In order to investigate the capability of the fault detection (FD) system in formation
ﬂying various faulty scenarios have been considered. In the ﬁrst scenario, a 45% drop
from the nominal value of bus voltage (VBUS) along the z-axis of the satellite #2 is
considered. Table 3.22 shows the actual healthy and the actual faulty output signals
and the classiﬁcation that is obtained by using the FD scheme. In this case, the
reaction wheel is operating under a healthy area of operation for 5000 steps and then
a bus voltage fault occurs and reaction wheel operates in the faulty area of operation
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Table 3.23: Actual and detection results in case of 50% drop from the nominal value of
the motor current(Im)) along the x-axis of satellite #3 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 4820 samples 5180 samples
DNN x-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 5700 samples 4300 samples
Table 3.24: Actual and detection results in case of 50% drop from the nominal value of
the viscous friction (τv) along the x-axis of satellite #1 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 5000 samples 5000 samples 4630 samples 5370 samples
DNN x-4 5000 samples 5000 samples 6900 samples 3100 samples
for 5000 steps.
Using the proposed FD scheme, the DNN embedded along the z-axis of the satel-
lite #2 estimates that the reaction wheel is working fault-free for 4590 steps and it
works faulty for 5410 steps. The DNN embedded along the z-axis of the satellite
#1 can also detect the eﬀects of the fault. Using this dynamic neural network it is
estimated that the satellite operates healthy for 6400 steps and it operates faulty for
3600 steps.
In the second faulty scenario, satellite works fault-free for 5000 time samples and
then a motor current fault (50% drop from the nominal value of the motor current
(Im) along the x-axis of satellite #3) occurs and satellite works faulty for 5000 steps.
Table 3.23 shows that by using the proposed formation ﬂying FD scheme for the x-
axis of satellite #3, it is estimated that the satellite works healthy for 4820 steps and
it then operates under a faulty situation for 5180 steps. The dynamic neural network
embedded along the x-axis of satellite #2 can detect the eﬀects of the fault after a
time delay. This DNN estimates that the satellite is in the healthy status for 5700
steps and it is in the faulty status for 4300 steps.
In the third scenario, the satellite operates in its fault-free operating zone for
5000 time samples and then a temperature fault (50% increase from the nominal
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Table 3.25: Actual and detection results in case of 10% drop from the nominal value of
the viscous friction (τv) along the y-axis of satellite #3 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN y-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 4950 samples 5050 samples
DNN y-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 5830 samples 4170 samples
Table 3.26: Actual and detection results in case of 15% drop from the nominal value
of the motor current(Im) along the y-axis of satellite #3 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN y-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 4940 samples 5060 samples
DNN y-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 6100 samples 4900 samples
value of viscous temperature (τv) along the x-axis of the satellite #1) occurs and the
satellite starts operating in the faulty zone for 5000 steps. Table 3.24 shows that by
using the proposed formation ﬂying FD scheme in the x-axis of the satellite #1, it is
estimated that the satellite is operating healthy for 4630 time samples and is working
in the faulty zone for 5370 steps. The DNN embedded in the x-axis of the satellite
#4 can detect the fault after a time delay as well. According to Table 3.24 this DNN
estimates that the reaction wheel is healthy for 6900 steps and is then faulty for 3100
steps.
In the fourth scenario, the spacecraft is working in the healthy status for 5000
steps and then a 10% increase in nominal value of the viscous friction (τv) fault occurs
along the y-axis of the satellite #3 and spacecraft works in this faulty situation for
5000 steps. The proposed formation ﬂying FD system for the y-axis of the satellite
#3 estimates that the spacecraft is healthy for 4950 steps and operates in the faulty
zone for 5050 steps. The DNN embedded along the y-axis of satellite #2 is also capa-
ble of detecting the fault after a time delay. This DNN estimates that the satellite is
operating healthy for 5830 steps and is operating faulty for 4170 steps. The analytical
results for the fourth scenario are depicted in Table 3.25.
A 15% drop from the nominal value of motor current (Im) fault along the y-axis
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Table 3.27: Actual and detection results in case of 70% drop from the nominal value
of the bus voltage (VBUS) along the x-axis of satellite #2 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples
DNN x-1 5000 samples 5000 samples 6950 samples 3050 samples
of satellite #3 is considered in the ﬁfth scenario. In this case, satellite operates in its
healthy status for 5000 steps and then a fault occurs and satellite operates faulty for
5000 steps. Using the DNN in the y-axis of satellite #3 in the proposed FD scheme
for the formation ﬂying of spacecraft, it is estimated that the satellite is healthy for
4940 steps and it operates faulty for 5060 steps. The DNN embedded along the y-
axis of satellite #2 can detect the fault after a short time delay as well. According
to Table 3.26 this DNN estimates that the satellite is healthy for 6100 steps and it is
operating faulty for 4900 steps.
In the sixth scenario, it is assumed that the spacecraft is working under the
healthy status for 5000 steps and then a 70% drop from the nominal value of the
bus voltage (VBUS) fault is injected along the x-axis of the satellite #2 and space-
craft works in this faulty situation for 5000 steps. The proposed formation ﬂying FD
system along the x-axis of the satellite #2 estimates that the spacecraft is fault-free
for 5000 steps and operates in the faulty zone for 5000 steps. The DNN embedded
along the x-axis of the satellite #1 is also capable of detecting the fault after a time
delay. This DNN estimates that the satellite is operating under the healthy zone for
6950 steps and is operating faulty for 3050 steps. The analytical results for the sixth
scenario are depicted in Table 3.27.
Considering the above six faulty scenarios for the satellite #i the following values
in Table 3.28 for the confusion matrix are obtained.
According to Table 3.29 the dynamic neural network embedded along the faulty
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Table 3.28: Confusion matrix parameters for faulty satellite(#i) and its nearest
neighbor(#(i− 1)).
DNN # A B C D
DNN of 30000 samples 0 samples 1070 samples 28930 samples
satellite #i
DNN of 23000 samples 7000 samples 420 samples 29580 samples
satellite #(i− 1)
Table 3.29: Confusion matrix results for faulty satellite(#i) and its nearest
neighbor(#(i− 1)).
DNN of satellite #i DNN of satellite #(i− 1)
Accuracy 98% 87%
True healthy 96% 98%
False healthy 0% 23%
True faulthy 100% 76%
False faulty 4% 2%
Precision 100% 82%
axis of the satellite #i can classify 96% of healthy signals and 100% of faulty sig-
nals successfully; however 4% of healthy signals are misclassiﬁed as faulty using this
method. The accuracy level (98%) and the precision level (100%) of this method are
highly acceptable. The dynamic neural network embedded along the corresponding
axis of satellite #(i−1) which is the nearest neighbor to satellite #i can classify 98%
of the healthy signals and 76% of faulty signals correctly. The accuracy level (87%)
and the precision (82%) are acceptable.
3.16.2 Confusion Matrix - Formation Flying FD - Second
Scheme
In order to investigate the fault detection capabilities of the proposed FD system in
formation ﬂying, various faulty scenarios have been considered. In the ﬁrst scenario,
a bus voltage fault (45% drop from the nominal value) along the z-axis of the satellite
#2 at the time sample of 5000 is considered. Table 3.30 shows the actual healthy and
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Table 3.30: Actual and detection results in case of 45% drop from the nominal value
of the bus voltage (VBUS) along the z-axis of satellite #2 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN z-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples
DNN z-1 5000 samples 5000 samples 5570 samples 4430 samples
DNN z-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 3550 samples 3450 samples
Table 3.31: Actual and detection results in case of 50% drop from the nominal value
of the motor current (Im) along the x-axis of satellite #3 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 5100 samples 4900 samples
DNN x-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 6100 samples 3900 samples
DNN x-4 5000 samples 5000 samples 5200 samples 4800 samples
the actual faulty output signals and the detection results that are obtained by using
the proposed FD scheme. In the second faulty case, a 50% drop from the nominal
value of the motor current fault is injected in the x-axis of the satellite #3 at the time
sample of 5000. Table 3.31 shows the actual healthy and the actual faulty output
signals and the fault detection results that are obtained by using the proposed FD
scheme. In the third scenario a high viscous temperature fault (50% increase from
the nominal value of the viscous friction) is injected in the x-axis of the satellite #1
at the time sample of 5000. The actual healthy and the actual faulty output signals
and the classiﬁcation results that are obtained by using the proposed FD scheme are
shown in Table 3.32. In the fourth scenario a high temperature fault that results in
a 10% increase in the nominal value of the viscous friction is injected in the y-axis
of the satellite #3 at the time sample of 5000. Table 3.33 shows the actual healthy
Table 3.32: Actual and detection results in case of 50% drop from the nominal value
of the motor current (Im) along the x-axis of satellite #1 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-1 5000 samples 5000 samples 5050 samples 4950 samples
DNN x-4 5000 samples 5000 samples 5850 samples 4150 samples
DNN x-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 6050 samples 3950 samples
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Table 3.33: Actual and detection results in case of 10% drop from the nominal value
of the motor current (Im) along the y-axis of satellite #3 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN y-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples
DNN y-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 6500 samples 3500 samples
DNN y-4 5000 samples 5000 samples 6200 samples 3800 samples
Table 3.34: Actual and detection results in case of 15% drop from the nominal value
of the motor current (Im) along the y-axis of satellite #3 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN y-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples
DNN y-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 6400 samples 3600 samples
DNN y-4 5000 samples 5000 samples 5900 samples 4100 samples
and the actual faulty output signals and the classiﬁcation results that are obtained
by using the proposed formation ﬂying FD scheme. A low motor current fault (15%
drop of nominal value) is injected in the y-axis of the satellite #3 at the time sample
of 5000 and the satellite remains faulty for 5000 steps in the ﬁfth scenario. Table 3.34
shows the actual healthy and the actual faulty output signals and the classiﬁcation
results that are obtained by using the proposed FD scheme. A low bus voltage fault
(70% drop of nominal value) has occured in the x-axis of the satellite #2 at the time
sample of 5000 and it lasts for 5000 steps in the last scenario. Table 3.35 shows the
actual healthy and the actual faulty output signals and the fault detection results
that are obtained by using the proposed FD scheme.
Considering the above six faulty scenarios for the satellite #i the following values
in Table 3.36 are obtained for the confusion matrix.
Table 3.35: Actual and detection results in case of 70% drop from the nominal value
of the bus voltage (VBUS) along the x-axis of satellite #2 by using 10000 time samples.
DNN # Actual Healthy Actual Faulty Estimated Healthy Estimated Faulty
DNN x-2 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples 5000 samples
DNN x-1 5000 samples 5000 samples 5300 samples 4700 samples
DNN x-3 5000 samples 5000 samples 5700 samples 4300 samples
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Table 3.36: Confusion matrix parameters for the faulty satellite (#i) and its two
nearest neighbors (#(i− 1) and #(i+ 1)).
DNN # A B C D
DNN of satellite #i 29850 samples 150 samples 0 samples 30000 samples
DNN of satellite #(i− 1) 25980 samples 4020 samples 300 samples 29700 samples
DNN of satellite #(i+ 1) 26050 samples 3950 samples 450 samples 29550 samples
Table 3.37: Confusion matrix results for the faulty satellite (#i) and its two nearest
neighbors (#(i− 1) and #(i+ 1)).
DNN of satellite DNN of satellite DNN of satellite
#i #(i− 1) #(i+ 1)
Accuracy 99% 92% 92%
True healthy 100% 99% 98.5%
False healthy 0% 13% 13%
True faulty 100% 87% 87%
False faulty 0% 1% 1.5%
Precision 100% 88% 88%
According to Table 3.37 the dynamic neural network embedded along the faulty
axis of the faulty spacecraft (i.e. satellite #i) can classify 100% of healthy signals and
100% of faulty signals successfully. The accuracy level (99%) and the precision level
(100%) of this method are highly acceptable. The dynamic neural network embedded
along the corresponding axis of satellite #(i − 1) and satellite #(i + 1) which are
the nearest neighbors to satellite #i can classify 99% of healthy signals and 87% of
faulty signals correctly. In comparison to the ﬁrst scheme, in this method both faulty
and healthy signals are classiﬁed more precisely. The accuracy level (92%) and the
precision (88%) are acceptable as well.
3.17 Conclusions
In this chapter a fault detection system methodology that is developed in [43] for a
single satellite is presented and its capabilities and shortcomings in detecting faults
are evaluated under diﬀerent faulty and fault free situations. A fault detection (FD)
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scheme for detecting actuator faults in a consensus-based controlled formation of
satellites is then proposed. In the single satellite FD system, when a fault occurs in
satellite #i, only the FD system embedded in the satellite #i can detect the fault.
On the other hand, in case of low severity faults, these local FD systems may fail to
detect faults.
For the formation ﬂying system two diﬀerent FD schemes are investigated in this
chapter and the capabilities of the proposed methods for detecting faults are evalu-
ated under diﬀerent fault scenarios. In the ﬁrst scheme, once a fault occurs in satellite
#i, the fault detection system in satellite #i can detect it immediately and the FD
system in satellite #(i − 1) can detect the fault with a time delay. So, the ﬁrst ad-
vantage of proposed FD scheme is that when a fault happens in a satellite it can be
detected by using local diagnosers immediately and then, after a time delay the fault
can be detected by using DNNs that are embedded in the nearest neighbor of the
faulty satellite. When the severity of fault increases, even the next neighbor (satellite
#(i− 2)) can detect the fault after longer time delay.
In the second scheme, once a fault occurs in satellite #i, it can be detected by
local diagnose immediately. However, since there are communication links between
each satellite and its two nearest neighbors, the DNN based FD systems that are
embedded in the two adjacent nearest neighbors of satellite #i (satellite #(i−1) and
satellite #(i+ 1)) can detect the fault occurrence after a short time delay. However,
depending on the fault severity, the next nearest neighbors of satellite #i might be
able to detect the fault after longer time delays.
The second advantage of the proposed methods (in both ﬁrst and second schemes)
is their ability to detect low severity faults. Using these schemes, bus voltage faults
greater than 45% drop from the nominal value and temperature and motor current
faults greater than 5% drop/increase from the nominal values can be detected. Using
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the second scheme (bi-directional communication method) the fault can be detected
in shorter time delay and the healthy and faulty signals are classiﬁed better (in the
ﬁrst scheme only 76% of faulty signals are classiﬁed correctly, but using the second
scheme almost 87% of faulty signals are classiﬁed correctly). The accuracy and pre-
cision levels are almost the same in both schemes.
The only disadvantage of the second scheme is that this scheme requires more
communication links as compared to the ﬁrst scheme, especially when a large number
of spacecraft are involved in the mission. The communication requirements for each
spacecraft during the formation are estimated as follows: In the decentralized control
approach, each spacecraft transmits its instantiation of r, v, q and ω of the virtual
structure to its two adjacent neighbors (in this thesis we have ignored the group
expansion/contraction and we only consider the group translation and the group ro-
tation). We know that r, v and ω each has 3 components and q has 4 components.
Thus the coordination vector has 13 components. Assume that each component is
encoded as B bits and the sampling rate of the system is L Hz. By communicating
with its two adjacent neighbors, each satellite requires a bandwidth of 26 BL/Hz. In
the single satellite FD system, each satellite only uses its own measurements of the
command voltage and the reaction torque in order to detect local faults. Thus, the
single satellite FD system does not require any additional communication links.
In the formation ﬂying FD system, in the ﬁrst scheme each satellite only sends
its attitude information to its previous neighbor (satellite #i send its attitude to
satellite #(i − 1)), and this requires 4 BL/Hz more bandwidth for each spacecraft.
In the second scheme, each satellite sends its attitude information to its two nearest
neighbors. Thus, this requires 8BL/Hz more bandwidth for each spacecraft in the
maneuver. Compared to the centralized method, there is no single point of failure
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in this proposed method. Also, compared to the centralized approach, fewer commu-
nication links are required in this method. The decentralized method provides more
ﬂexibility and reliability when compared to the centralized approaches.
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Chapter 4
Fault Isolation, Fault Type
Determination and Fault Severity
Estimation Scheme for a Formation
Flight of Satellites
In Chapter 3, we have developed a decentralized fault detection scheme for a formation
ﬂying of spacecraft. In order to evaluate the capabilities of the proposed scheme, we
have injected various fault scenarios in the attitude control subsystem of the spacecraft
and it was shown that when a fault occurs in an actuator of one of the satellites in the
formation, the fault diagnosis system embedded in the faulty spacecraft can detect
the fault immediately, and the dynamic neural network embedded in its adjacent
spacecraft can detect the fault after a short time delay. The next step in an FDI
process of a system is fault isolation. Fault isolation is the practice of determining
the faulty actuator in the formation and isolating it from other actuators in the
system. Limiting the scope of the problem decreases the possibility of serious damage
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in the entire formation system.
4.1 Fault Isolation Logic
In general, three reaction wheels are embedded in a spacecraft system, and each
of them is located along one of the three axes of the spacecraft. In our proposed
formation ﬂying fault diagnosis system, a dynamic neural network is embedded along
each axis of each satellite in the formation. When a high severity fault occurs in one
of the reaction wheels in the i-th spacecraft in the formation, the dynamic neural
network that is embedded along the corresponding axis of the i-th spacecraft can
detect the fault immediately (without time delay). In this way, one not only can
detect a fault, but also can isolate the faulty actuator in the formation.
4.1.1 Fault Isolation Results for a Formation Flying of Satel-
lites
In Chapter 3, a fault detection scheme is proposed for the reaction wheels of the
satellites in a formation ﬂight mission. The proposed methodology has the capability
of detecting and isolating actuator faults simultaneously. The fault isolation logic
is based on the fault detection time delays in the formation ﬂying system. This
capability has been investigated under various fault scenarios:
• First scenario: In this case, a 60% drop from nominal value of the bus voltage
fault along the x-axis of the satellite #1 has occurred. The fault detection time
delay results are depicted in Table 4.1. According to Table 4.1 once this fault
occurs along the x-axis of satellite #1, the corresponding DNN along the x-axis
of the satellite #1 can detect the fault immediately, and the DNNs embedded
along the other axes of satellite #1 can detect the fault after a short time delay
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Table 4.1: Fault detection time delays in case of 60% drop from nominal value in the
bus voltage of x-axis of satellite #1.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay Faulty Axis
DNN x-1 YES 0 sec ×
DNN y-1 YES 5 sec
DNN z-1 YES 5 sec
DNN x-2 NO -
DNN y-2 NO -
DNN z-2 NO -
DNN x-3 YES 15 sec
DNN y-3 YES 17 sec
DNN z-3 YES 15 sec
DNN x-4 YES 11 sec
DNN y-4 YES 7 sec
DNN z-4 YES 8 sec
(approximately 5 seconds). In our proposed fault detection scheme, the attitude
information of satellite #1 is transmitted to its adjacent neighbor (i.e. satellite
#4) according to Fig. 3.18. Once a fault occurs in satellite #1 it aﬀects the
attitude of satellite #4 and satellite #3. Since the DNNs embedded in satellite
#4 are trained based on the relative attitude of satellite #4 with respect to
satellite #1, the DNNs embedded in satellite #4 and satellite #3 can detect
the fault after a time delay. Since satellite #4 is the closest satellite to satellite
#1 in the formation (as far as communication delay is considered), the DNNs in
satellite #4 detect the fault within a shorter time delay and since satellite #2 is
the farthest satellite from satellite #1 in the formation (as far as communication
delay is considered), the DNNs in satellite #2 cannot detect the fault that has
occurred in satellite #1. Table 4.1 shows that the DNN in the z-axis of the
satellite #1 is the ﬁrst DNN in the formation-level FD system that can detect
the fault occurrence. This reveals that the reaction wheel along the x-axis of
the satellite #1 is faulty.
• Second scenario: In this case a motor current fault (50% drop from the nominal
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Table 4.2: Fault detection time delays in case of 50% drop of nominal values in the
motor current of x-axis of satellite #2.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay Faulty Axis
DNN x-1 YES 13 sec
DNN y-1 YES 10 sec
DNN z-1 YES 10 sec
DNN x-2 YES 0 sec ×
DNN y-2 YES 6 sec
DNN z-2 YES 2 sec
DNN x-3 NO -
DNN y-3 NO -
DNN z-3 NO -
DNN x-4 YES 15 sec
DNN y-4 YES 20 sec
DNN z-4 YES 15 sec
value) has occurred in the x-axis of the satellite #2 in a formation ﬂight mission.
When this fault occurs in the x-axis of the satellite #2, the DNN in the x-axis
of the satellite #2 can detect the fault immediately and since in our proposed
formation level fault detection system, the attitude information of satellite #2
is transmitted to satellite #1 (the adjacent spacecraft in the ring topology),
therefore, the DNNs in the satellite #1 can detect the fault occurrence after a
short time delay. In the ring topology, the attitude information of the satellite
#2 is then transmitted to the satellite #4, therefor the DNNs in the satellite
#4 can detect the fault within a longer time delay. The fault detection time
delays in the DNNs of the satellites in the formation ﬂight mission are depicted
in Table 4.2.
• Third scenario: In this case a low severity viscous friction fault (10% increase
from the nominal value) has occurred along the y-axis of the satellite #3. The
time delays in the fault detection are shown in Table 4.3. According to this table,
once a fault is occurred along the y-axis of satellite #3, the DNN embedded
along the faulty axis of the faulty spacecraft (satellite #3) can detect the fault
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Table 4.3: Fault detection time delays in case of 10% increase in nominal values of
the viscous friction of y-axis of satellite #3.
Dynamic Neural Network # Fault Detected Detection Time Delay Faulty Axis
DNN x-1 NO -
DNN y-1 NO -
DNN z-1 NO -
DNN x-2 YES 14 sec
DNN y-2 YES 16 sec
DNN z-2 YES 14 sec
DNN x-3 YES 7 sec
DNN y-3 YES 0 sec ×
DNN z-3 YES 8 sec
DNN x-4 NO -
DNN y-4 NO -
DNN z-4 NO -
immediately (0 second time delay), and then the fault is detected by DNNs along
the x-axis and z-axes of satellite #3. The closest agent to the satellite #3 in the
formation is satellite #2. Therefore, the attitude deviations in satellite #3 will
aﬀect the orientation of satellite #2 within a short time delay. Therefore the
DNNs embedded in satellite #2 can detect the fault after a time delay. Due to
the low severity of the temperature fault that is occurred in this scenario (10%
increase from the nominal value) the fault occurrence in satellite #3 does not
aﬀect the second nearest neighbor of satellite #3 in the ring topology. Therefore
only DNNs in the satellite #3 (the faulty satellite) and satellite #2 (the nearest
neghbor of the faulty satellite) can detect the fault, and since according to Table
4.3 the DNN in the y-axis of the satellite #3 can detect fault in the ﬁrst place,
this reveals that the fault is occured in the y-axis of the satellite #3.
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4.2 A Dynamic Neural Network-Based Method-
ology for Fault Type Classiﬁcation and Fault
Severity Estimation
In this section a multi dynamic neural network-based method is proposed for fault
type classiﬁcation and fault severity estimation in actuators of the satellites in the
formation ﬂying mission. In this approach, in the ﬁrst level, a dynamic neural network
is employed for classifying the actuator faults into one of the three actuator fault type
categories, namely, bus voltage fault, motor current fault and temperature fault. In
the second level, this DNN-based fault type classiﬁer is followed by another dynamic
neural network to estimate the fault severity in the faulty actuator.
4.2.1 Fault Type Classiﬁcation Using Dynamic Neural Clas-
siﬁer
In general three types of faults may occur in the reaction wheels of a spacecraft,
namely, a bus voltage fault, a motor current fault and a viscous friction fault as
shown in Table 4.4. These three types of faults have been described in Section 2.8. In
this methodology, after detecting fault occurrence in the formation ﬂying system and
isolating the faulty actuator (determining the location of the faulty reaction wheel
in the formation ﬂying system) in order to determine the type of the fault that has
occurred in the faulty actuator, a dynamic neural network-based method is proposed.
The structure of the proposed scheme is depicted in Fig. 4.1. In this scheme, the
residual signals that are generated in the formation-level fault detection system are
processed such that the magnitudes of the residual signal before and right after the
fault occurrence is applied as the two input to the DNN-based classiﬁer. The output of
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Figure 4.1: Dynamic neural network-based scheme for fault type determination.
Table 4.4: Reaction wheel fault types assignments.
Reaction Wheel Assigned Fault
Fault Type Type Class
Motor current fault +1
Bus voltage fault -1
Temperature fault 0
the neural classiﬁer determines the fault type that has occurred in the faulty actuator.
4.2.2 Training Phase
In this section, the residual signals which are generated by using the formation level
dynamic neural network-based fault detection scheme are processed as the input data
to train the dynamic neural classiﬁers. In order to train the DNN-based fault type
classiﬁers, the residual signals that are collected under various faulty operating con-
dition of the spacecraft and are used for training purposes. The magnitudes of the
residual signal before and right after the fault occurrence are applied as the two
inputs to the dynamic neural classiﬁer. Preprocessing steps are performed on the
input/output data pairs so that all the data used for DNN training are normalized in
the range of [-1, +1]. The training process is then carried out based on an extended
dynamic back-propagation algorithm for each axis.
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The network parameters are initialized with small random values and the IIR ﬁl-
ter’s denominator coeﬃcients are initialized to zeros. The structure of the dynamic
neural network contains one hidden layer of hyperbolic tangent activation functions
and one output layer of linear activation functions. The neurons embedded in the
structure of the dynamic neural network have second order IIR ﬁlters. The training
process is started from a relatively small network structure and the optimum structure
is obtained by incrementally increasing the number of hidden neurons until required
performance speciﬁcations are met. The training phase is conducted for each DNN
that is employed along each axis of the satellite. The best results are obtained using
a N2−5−1 structure, which implies that there is two neuron in the input layer (the
ﬁrst input of the network is the magnitude of the residual signal generated in the
formation level fault detection system before fault occurrence and the second input of
the neural classiﬁer is the magnitude of the residual signal after the fault occurrence),
8 neurons in the hidden layer and one neuron in the output layer (the output of the
neural classiﬁer is the corresponding fault type class). The learning rate parameter
is set to 0.001. The training process is accomplished by using Monte Carlo’s simula-
tions under diﬀerent noisy conditions for 20000 fault scenarios (including 5000 motor
current fault scenarios, 5000 bus voltage fault scenarios and 5000 temperature fault
scenarios and 5000 fault free scenarios). The performance indices (i.e. mean square
error) of the neural classiﬁers during the training phase for 3 axis of satellite #1 are
depicted in Fig. 4.2.
4.2.3 Testing Phase
The classiﬁcation capability of the trained DNN-based classiﬁer is evaluated in the
testing phase. In the testing phase another input/output data set is used to evaluate




Figure 4.2: The performance index (mean squared error of the fault classes) curve for
the dynamic neural network classiﬁer- satellite #1 (a) x-axis, (b) y-axis (c) z-axis.
161
accomplished for 20000 diﬀerent pairs of input residual signal data that is generated
under 15000 diﬀerent faulty scenarios (including 5000 bus voltage fault scenarios, 5000
temperature fault scenarios, 5000 motor current fault scenarios and 5000 fault free
scenarios) are applied to the trained neural classiﬁers to investigate the classiﬁcation
capabilities of the trained networks. These residual signals are generated by using
the formation-level fault detection systems of the satellites in presence of normally
distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences between
the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output data intervals. Fig. 4.3
shows the actual fault type class and the output of the neural classiﬁer in the testing
phase in the three axes of the satellite #1. The results indicate that the trained
DNNs have the ability to classify the faults of the reaction wheels correctly. The
testing phase for the other satellites can be accomplished in a similar way.
4.2.4 Fault Type Classiﬁcation Results
In order to investigate the classiﬁcation capabilities of the proposed neural classiﬁers,
these classiﬁers are applied following the formation level fault detection system in the
formation ﬂying mission. The following three diﬀerent fault scenarios are considered
in this section:
• First scenario: In this scenario a bus voltage fault (45% drop from the nominal
value) has occurred in the z-axis of the satellite #2 in the formation ﬂying. The
residual signal that is generated in the formation level fault detection scheme
is applied to the neural classiﬁer and Fig. 4.4 shows that the proposed neural
classiﬁer can detect the fault type correctly and assign the actuator fault to the
correct fault class.
• Second scenario: In this scenario a motor current fault (50% drop from the




Figure 4.3: Testing curve (actual and estimated fault classes) for the DNN - (a) x-axis,
(b) y-axis, and (c) z-axis of the satellite #1.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: First scenario: (a)Residual signal from the formation level fault detection
system (b) Output of DNN-based fault type classiﬁer.
ﬂying. The neural classiﬁer receives the residual signal that is generated in the
formation level fault detection scheme as the input data and determines the
fault type. Fig. 4.5 shows that the proposed neural classiﬁer can detect the
fault type correctly and assigns the actuator fault to the correct fault class.
• Third scenario: In this case, a 50% increase in the nominal value of the viscous
friction occurs in the x-axis of the satellite #1. Fig. 4.6 shows that the proposed
dynamic neural classiﬁer has the capability of classifying the actuator fault
correctly.
4.2.5 Dynamic Neural Network-Based Fault Severity Esti-
mation Method
In this section a dynamic neural network-based scheme is proposed for estimating
fault severity in the faulty actuator in the formation ﬂight mission. When a fault
occurrence in one of the actuators in the formation is detected in the the formation
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.5: Second scenario: (a)Residual signal from the formation level fault detec-
tion system (b) Output of DNN-based fault type classiﬁer.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: Third scenario: (a)Residual signal from the formation level fault detection
system (b) Output of DNN-based fault type classiﬁer.
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Figure 4.7: Dynamic neural network-based scheme for fault severity estimation.
level dynamic neural networks, the location of the faulty actuator is determined in
the fault isolation step and the fault type is determined by using the proposed DNN-
based method in Section 4.2.1. The next step is to propose a method for estimating
fault severity in the faulty actuator in the formation. In order to fulﬁll this objective,
in our proposed scheme, the DNN-based fault type classiﬁer is followed by another
dynamic neural network that is employed for estimating fault severity in the faulty
actuator. This fault estimation DNN is also trained based on the residual signals that
are obtained from the formation level fault detection system. The structure of the
DNN-based fault severity estimation unit is depicted in Fig. 4.7.
The residual signals that are generated in the formation level fault detection
systems under faulty operating conditions are processed such that the input of the
fault severity estimation neural network is the diﬀerence magnitude in the residual
signal before and right after the fault occurrence. A quantitative study of the eﬀects
of the motor current, the viscous temperature and the bus voltage fault severities
on the residual signals that are generated in the corresponding faulty axis of the
faulty satellite is provided in Tables 4.5-4.7, respectively. According to these tables,
as the severity of actuator fault increases, the diﬀerence magnitude in the steady
state residual signal at the fault occurrence time increases. This property is used
to determine the severity of the fault in the actuators of a satellite in the formation
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Table 4.5: Motor current fault severity at the time of fault occurrence.
Fault Severity Healthy Magnitude Faulty Magnitude Diﬀerence
of the residual signal of the residual signal Magnitude
at the fault time at the fault time
5% Im -0.03625 -0.1017 0.06545
10% Im -0.0310 -0.1620 0.131
15% Im -0.0453 -0.2416 0.1963
20% Im -0.0260 -0.2880 0.262
30% Im 0.1120 -0.2815 0.3935
45% Im 0.8807 0.2916 0.5891
50% Im 1.1291 0.47471 0.6544
55% Im 1.089 0.3690 0.72
60% Im 1.188 0.4026 0.7854
75% Im 1.206 0.2240 0.982
80% Im 1.1885 0.1410 1.0475
90% Im 1.200 0.0173 1.1827
95% Im 1.2126 -0.0080 1.2206
structure.
4.2.6 Training Phase
In this section, the residual signals which are generated by using the formation level
dynamic neural network-based fault detection scheme are processed and the diﬀerence
between the magnitude of the residual signal before fault occurrence and the magni-
tude of the residual signal right after the fault occurrence is applied as the input data
to train the dynamic neural networks to estimate the fault severity.
In order to train the DNN-based fault type classiﬁers, the residual signals that
are collected under various faulty operating condition of the spacecraft are used in
training phase. Preprocessing steps are performed on the input/output data pairs so
that all the data used for DNN training are normalized in the range of [-1, +1]. The
training process is then carried out based on an extended dynamic back-propagation
algorithm for each axis.
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Table 4.6: Motor current fault severity at the time of fault occurrence.
Fault Severity Healthy Magnitude Faulty Magnitude Diﬀerence
of the residual signal of the residual signal Magnitude
at the fault time at the fault time
5% τv 0.0143 0.0591 0.0448
10% τv 0.0140 0.1038 0.0898
15% τv 0.0140 0.1483 0.1343
20% τv 0.0540 0.2330 0.1790
30% τv -0.0267 -0.2952 0.2685
45% τv 0.0118 0.4147 0.4029
50% τv 0.0670 0.5141 0.4471
55% τv 0.0093 0.5010 0.4917
60% τv -0.015 -0.5520 0.537
75% τv -0.2940 0.3774 0.668
80% τv 0.467 -0.2491 0.7161
90% τv 0.6680 -0.1378 0.8058
95% τv -0.6048 0.222 0.8268
Table 4.7: Motor current fault severity at the time of fault occurrence.
Fault Severity Healthy magnitude Faulty magnitude Diﬀerence
of the residual signal of the residual signal magnitude
at the fault occurrence at the fault occurrence
45% VBUS -0.862 0.1075 0.9695
50% VBUS -0.9561 0.1193 1.0754
55% VBUS -1.05 0.13115 1.18115
60% VBUS -1.108 0.1446 1.2526
65% VBUS -1.241 0.1548 1.3958
70% VBUS -1.334 0.1666 1.5006
75% VBUS -1.430 0.1784 1.6084
80% VBUS -1.525 0.191 1.716
85% VBUS -1.620 0.2021 1.8221
90% VBUS -1.715 0.215 1.93
95% VBUS -1.818 0.226 2.044
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The network parameters are initialized with small random values and the IIR ﬁl-
ter’s denominator coeﬃcients are initialized to zeros. The structure of the dynamic
neural network contains one hidden layer of hyperbolic tangent activation functions
and one output layer of linear activation functions. The neurons embedded in the
structure of the dynamic neural network have second order IIR ﬁlters. The train-
ing process is started from a relatively small network structure and the optimum
structure is obtained by incrementally increasing the number of hidden neurons until
required performance speciﬁcations are met. The training phase is conducted for each
DNN that is employed along each axis of the satellite. The best results are obtained
using a N1−7−1 structure, which implies that there is one neuron in the input layer
(the input of the network is the diﬀerence magnitude of the residual signal that is
generated in the formation level fault detection system at the fault occurrence time),
7 neurons in the hidden layer and one neuron in the output layer (The output of the
neural classiﬁer is the fault severity). The learning rate parameter is set to 0.001.
The training process is accomplished by using Monte Carlo’s simulations under dif-
ferent noisy conditions for 30000 fault scenarios (including 10000 motor current fault
scenarios, 10000 bus voltage fault scenarios and 10000 temperature fault scenarios).
The networks are trained for diﬀerent pairs of input/output data in presence of a
normally distributed noise with zero mean and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences
between the maximum and the minimum values in the input/output data intervals.
The performance of the dynamic neural networks during the training phase for 3 axis
of satellite #1 is depicted in Fig. 4.8.
4.2.7 Testing Phase
The capability of the trained DNNs in estimating actuator fault severity is investi-




Figure 4.8: The performance index (mean squared error of the fault severity) curve
for the dynamic neural network in fault severity estimation- satellite #1 (a) x-axis,
(b) y-axis (c) z-axis.
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Figure 4.9: Testing curve (actual and estimated fault severity) for the DNNs in fault
severity estimation level- Motor current fault.
evaluate the capabilities of the trained DNNs to estimate the fault severities. The
testing step for the motor current faults is accomplished for 10000 diﬀerent pairs of
input residual signal data that is generated under 10000 various faulty cases (includ-
ing 10000 motor current fault scenarios) is applied to the trained dynamic neural
networks to investigate the capabilities of the trained networks. The residual sig-
nals that are generated by using the formation-level fault detection systems of the
satellites in the formation in presence of a normally distributed noise with zero mean
and standard deviation of 0.01 diﬀerences between the maximum and the minimum
values in the input/output data intervals is applied as the input data to the neural
networks in fault severity estimation level. Fig. 4.9 shows the actual fault severity
and the output of the neural classiﬁer in the testing phase. The results indicate that
the trained DNNs have the ability to estimate the fault severity in the reaction wheels
correctly. The testing phase for the other axes of the satellite can be accomplished
in a similar way.
In order to investigate the capabilities of the proposed DNN-based method in
estimating temperature fault severities in the faulty actuator of the faulty satellite
in the formation, 10000 various temperature fault scenarios are considered and the
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Figure 4.10: Testing curve (actual and estimated fault severity) for the DNNs in fault
severity estimation level- Temperature fault.
Figure 4.11: Testing curve (actual and estimated fault severity) for the DNNs in fault
severity estimation level- Bus voltage fault.
actual fault severity and estimated value for the fault severity is depicted in Fig. 4.10.
In Fig. 4.11 the capabilities of the proposed method is tested for 5500 diﬀerent
bus voltage scenarios are investigated. The actual fault severities and the estimated
fault severities (by using the DNN-based approach) is depicted in this ﬁgure.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.12: First scenario: (a) Residual signal from the formation level fault detec-
tion system (b) o utput of DNN-based fault severity estimator.
4.2.8 Fault Severity Estimation Results Using Dynamic Neu-
ral Network-Based Method
In order to investigate the capabilities of the proposed dynamic neural networks in
estimating fault severity in the faulty actuator in the formation ﬂight mission, various
fault scenarios are considered. The DNNs for fault severity estimation level are applied
following the fault type determination system in the formation ﬂying mission. In this
section, the following three diﬀerent fault scenarios are considered:
• First scenario: In this scenario a bus voltage fault (70% drop from the nominal
value) is occurred in the x-axis of the satellite #2 in the formation ﬂying. The
residual signal that is generated in the formation level fault detection scheme
is applied to the neural classiﬁer and Fig. 4.12 show that the proposed neural
classiﬁer can detect the fault type correctly and assign the actuator fault to the
correct fault class.
• Second scenario: In this scenario a motor current fault (80% drop from the
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.13: Second scenario: (a) Residual signal from the formation level fault
detection system (b) output of DNN-based fault severity estimator.
nominal value) is occurred in the y-axis of the satellite #4 in the formation
ﬂying. The neural classiﬁer receives the residual signal that is generated in the
formation level fault detection scheme as the input data and determines the
fault type. Fig. 4.13 shows that the proposed neural classiﬁer can detect the
fault type correctly and assign the actuator fault to the correct fault class.
• Third scenario: In this case, a 50% increase in the nominal value of the viscous
friction occurs in the x-axis of the satellite #2. Fig. 4.14 shows that the




Figure 4.14: Third scenario: (a) Residual signal from the formation level fault detec-
tion system (b) output of DNN-based fault severity estimator.
4.3 A Static Neural Network-Based Methodology
for Fault Type Classiﬁcation and Fault Sever-
ity Estimation
In Chapter 3, it is shown that by using the proposed formation ﬂying fault detec-
tion methodology, bus voltage faults greater than 45% drop from the nominal value
can be detected. In addition, the proposed method has the capability of detecting
motor current faults and temperature faults greater than 5% drop/increase from the
nominal values. The proposed method can detect the fault occurrence and isolate
the fault (i.e detect the location of the fault in the formation ﬂying) at the same
time. In this section a multilayer perceptron neural network that is depicted as in
Fig. 2.1 and is directly applied following the dynamic neural network detectors to
classify the residual signals that are generated by using the formation ﬂying fault
diagnosis system. This neural classiﬁer receives information from the residual error
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Figure 4.15: General structure of the fault type classiﬁcation and fault severity esti-
mation system.
signals and determines the type and the severity of the fult that has occurred in the
faulty actuator.
In order to perform the classiﬁcation task, the neural classiﬁer has to be trained
on the residual error signals that are generated in the formation level dynamic neural
fault diagnosis system by using the back-propagation method and then the classiﬁer
performs the residual validation task and assigns each of the residual signals to one
of the predeﬁned fault type classes and estimate the severity of fault.
The general structure of the fault type classiﬁcation and fault severity estimation
system is depicted in Fig. 4.15. In this structure, the DNN that is employed along
each axis of each satellite in the formation is followed by a static neural classiﬁer that
is employed for the fault type classiﬁcation purposes. The classiﬁers are applied for
classifying residual error signals which are generated during the steady state oper-
ation of the spacecraft and they have the capability of classifying single faults that
have been injected in the reaction wheels of each axis of the spacecraft, including the
voltage fault, motor current fault and viscous temperature fault. Using the proposed
method, the severity of the actuator fault can be estimated too.
When a fault is detected in one of the axes of the satellite #i in the formation,
the neural classiﬁer embedded along the faulty axis of the faulty spacecraft receives
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the magnitude of the residual signal before and after the fault occurrence. The static
neural network is trained based on residual signals (value of the residual signals at
the moment of the fault occurrence as well as before and after of the fault occurrence)
and classiﬁes the residual signals into one of the fault type categories.
In our proposed FDI scheme, when the system is fault free, the residual signal
remains in the threshold boundaries. Once a fault occurs in the reaction wheel of
one of the spacecraft in the formation, the residual signal exceeds the threshold and
the fault is detected. When a severe fault occurs in the actuators, the residual signal
exceeds the threshold, but when the fault severity is low, the residual signal exceeds
signiﬁcantly the threshold. The increased severity of the fault results in increasing the
diﬀerence magnitude of the residual signal at the moment of fault occurrence before
and after the fault occurrence.
4.4 A Static Neural Network-Based Fault Type
Classiﬁcation and Fault Severity Estimation
Method
A static multilayer perceptron neural classiﬁer is constructed along each axis of each
spacecraft in the formation. These static neural networks receive the residual sig-
nals that are generated in the formation-level fault detection system and process the
residual signal that is generated in the faulty axis of the faulty spacecraft in the for-
mation and use the magnitude of the residual signal right before and after the fault
occurrence as inputs. The ﬁrst and the second output of the neural network are the
fault type and the fault severity, respectively.
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4.4.1 Training Phase
The proposed static neural networks are trained using the residual signal that is
generated in the formation-level fault detection system of the faulty spacecraft in
the mission, under diﬀerent faulty conditions (including bus voltage fault scenarios,
motor current fault scenarios and temperature fault scenarios). The learning process
is carried out based on the back-propagation algorithm for 20000 input/output data
set corresponding to motor current faults, 20000 input/output data set corresponding
to the temperature fault cases and 11000 input/output data set corresponding to bus
voltage fault scenarios, and the best results are obtained with the network structure
of N2−5−5−2, which implies that there are two inputs (which are the magnitude of
the residual error signal before and after the fault occurrence), 5 neurons in the
ﬁrst hidden layer, 5 neurons in the second hidden layer and 2 outputs (the ﬁrst
output identiﬁes the fault type and the second output determines the fault severity).
The learning rate is set to 0.005. The network is trained for 10000 epochs until
a performance index requirement is satisﬁed. Fig. 4.16 shows that the required
performance index (i.e. the mean square error) is satisﬁed during the training phase.
4.4.2 Testing Phase
In order to evaluate the capabilities of the trained neural network, we use the trained
static neural network to classify diﬀerent fault types and estimate the severities of
the faults that can occur in the reaction wheel of the spacecraft along one axis. In
the testing step, the residual signals that are generated under 10000 diﬀerent motor
current fault scenarios, 10000 diﬀerent temperature fault scenarios and 5500 diﬀerent
bus voltage scenarios are applied to the neural classiﬁer and the output signals are
depicted in Fig. 4.17- Fig. 4.19. These ﬁgures show that the proposed classiﬁer can
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Figure 4.16: Learning curve for the static neural classiﬁer network.
classify the fault type and estimate the fault severity with an acceptable accuracy.
In this step, ﬁrst in order to evaluate the capability of this static neural network-
based method, 10000 diﬀerent motor current fault scenarios are considered. The
residual signals that are generated using the DNNs in the formation ﬂying level fault
detection system under these 10000 diﬀerent motor current fault scenarios are applied
to the neural classiﬁer.
The neural classiﬁer receives the residual signal. The magnitude of the residual
signal at the moment of fault occurrence (the magnitude of the residual signal right
before and after of fault occurrence) are applied as the two inputs of the neural
classiﬁer. The output of the neural classiﬁer under these 10000 motor current fault
scenarios is shown in Fig. 4.17. This ﬁgure shows that when a motor current fault
has occurred in a reaction wheel in the formation ﬂight system, the proposed static
neural classiﬁer can detect the fault type correctly (the actual fault type class that is
assigned for motor current faults is +1, and the static neural classiﬁer can classify the
fault type correctly. However, there are some miss classiﬁcations in some samples).
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Figure 4.17: Fault classiﬁcation results for 10000 diﬀerent motor current fault sce-
narios.
According to Fig. 4.17 the proposed static classiﬁer can estimate the fault severity.
The actual and the estimated fault severities in various 10000 motor current fault
cases are depicted in Fig. 4.17.
In order to evaluate the capability of the proposed neural classiﬁer in classifying
the temperature faults, 10000 diﬀerent temperature faults are considered. The neural
classiﬁers process the residual signals generated in DNNs of the formation ﬂying
system. These neural networks employ the magnitude of the residual signal at the
moment right before and after of the fault occurrence as the input signal. Fig. 4.18
shows the actual fault type and fault severity and the estimated outputs of the neural
network classiﬁer for 10000 diﬀerent temperature fault scenarios. It shows that the
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Figure 4.18: Fault classiﬁcation results for 10000 diﬀerent temperature fault scenarios.
proposed static neural network an detect the fault type and it can estimate the fault
severity.
The capabilities of the proposed methodology in classifying the actuator fault
type and the fault severity have been further investigated under 5500 diﬀerent bus
voltage scenarios. The residual error signals that are generated under 5500 diﬀerent
bus voltage scenarios have been applied as the input to the neural network classiﬁer.
The actual fault type and fault severity and the estimated values that are obtained
by using static neural network are depicted in Fig. 4.19.
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Figure 4.19: Fault classiﬁcation results for 10000 diﬀerent bus voltage fault scenarios.
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4.4.3 Fault Type Determination and Fault Severity Estima-
tion Results Using Static Neural Network-Based Method
In this section, in order to evaluate the capabilities of the proposed static neural
network-based classiﬁcation method, diﬀerent fault scenarios is considered. In the
following scenarios, the static neural network receives the residual signal that is gen-
erated under faulty situation in the formation level fault detection system and the
magnitude of the residual signal before fault occurrence and right after the fault oc-
currence is applied as the two inputs to the static neural network. The two outputs
of the static neural network, that are trained using back-propagation method, is the
actuator fault type and actuator fault severity, respectively.
• First scenario: In this case a 45% drop from the nominal value of the bus voltage
fault has occured in the reaction wheel of the z-axis of the satellite #2 in the
formation ﬂight mission. Fig. 4.20 shows the actual and estimated values for
the type and the severity of the fault that has occurred in the faulty actuator
in the formation.
• Second scenario: In the second scenario, a motor current fault (80% drop from
the nominal value) has been injected in the reaction wheel along the y-axis of
the satellite #4 in the formation ﬂight mission. The residual signal generated
in the formation level fault detection system and the estimated and the actual
value of the fault severity and the fault type is depicted in Fig. 4.21.
• Third scenario: In this case a 50% increase in the nominal value of the viscous
friction has occurred in the reaction wheel in the x-axis of the satellite #2 in
the formation ﬂight mission. The residual signals that are generated in the
fault detection system in the formation level and the output of the static neural




Figure 4.20: First scenario: (a) Residual signal from the formation level fault detec-




Figure 4.21: Second scenario: (a) Residual signal from the formation level fault




Figure 4.22: Third scenario: (a) Residual signal from the formation level fault detec-
tion system (b) Fault type(c) Fault severity.
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4.5 Analysis of the Results
In this chapter, two diﬀerent method for fault type detection and fault severity esti-
mation in the actuators of a satellite in a formation ﬂight mission is proposed. In the
ﬁrst approach, the classiﬁcation task is performed by using dynamic neural networks
that are introduced in Chapter 2. In the second approach, the conventional static
neural networks are employed to detect the fault type and the fault severity in the
faulty actuator in the formation ﬂight mission. In order to evaluate the classiﬁcation
capabilities of our proposed schemes, the confusion matrix method is used.
4.5.1 Analysis of the Results for the Dynamic Neural Network-
Based Method for Fault Type Classiﬁcation and Fault
Severity Estimation
In order to evaluate the fault type classiﬁcation and the fault severity estimation ca-
pabilities of the proposed dynamic neural network-based method a confusion matrix
analysis is used. The actual and estimated fault type and fault severity for 30 diﬀerent
motor current scenarios are depicted in Table 4.8. Thirty (30) diﬀerent temperature
fault scenarios are considered and the actual and the estimated fault type and fault
severity estimation results are depicted in Table 4.9. Finally, in Table 4.10 the actual
and estimated values for fault type and fault severity in the faulty actuator in the
formation ﬂying system under 20 diﬀerent bus voltage scenarios are listed.
In Tables 4.8-4.10 the classiﬁcation results for 80 diﬀerent faulty scenarios,
including 30 temperature fault scenarios, 30 motor current fault scenarios and 20 bus
voltage fault scenarios that are described above are shown. Table 4.11 shows the
number of patterns in each fault class and the number of patterns that are correctly/
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Table 4.8: Actual and classiﬁcation results under 30 diﬀerent motor current fault
cases - DNN method.
Fault type Actual Fault Classiﬁed Fault Estimated Fault
Severity Type Severity
Motor Current Fault 10% +1 2.8%
Motor Current Fault 12% +1 3.94%
Motor Current Fault 15% +1 10.02%
Motor Current Fault 20% +1 21.32%
Motor Current Fault 30% +1 32.15%
Motor Current Fault 32% +1 33.05%
Motor Current Fault 35% +1 35.98%
Motor Current Fault 38% +1 38.13%
Motor Current Fault 40% +1 40.15%
Motor Current Fault 42% +1 42.05%
Motor Current Fault 45% +1 45.03%
Motor Current Fault 48% +1 48%
Motor Current Fault 50% +1 49.98%
Motor Current Fault 52% +1 52%
Motor Current Fault 55% +1 55%
Motor Current Fault 58% +1 58%
Motor Current Fault 60% +1 60%
Motor Current Fault 62% +1 62%
Motor Current Fault 65% +1 65%
Motor Current Fault 68% +1 68%
Motor Current Fault 70% +1 70%
Motor Current Fault 72% +1 72%
Motor Current Fault 75% +1 75%
Motor Current Fault 78% +1 78%
Motor Current Fault 80% +1 80%
Motor Current Fault 82% +1 82%
Motor Current Fault 85% +1 85%
Motor Current Fault 88% +1 88%
Motor Current Fault 90% +1 90%
Motor Current Fault 95% +1 95%
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Table 4.9: Actual and classiﬁcation results under 30 diﬀerent temperature fault cases
- DNN method.
Fault type Actual Fault Classiﬁed Fault Estimated Fault
Severity Type Severity
Temperature Fault 10% 0.5 2.8%
Temperature Fault 12% 0.11 3.94%
Temperature Fault 15% 0.07 10.02%
Temperature Fault 18% 0.04 17.82%
Temperature Fault 20% 0.01 21.32%
Temperature Fault 22% 0.01 26.34%
Temperature Fault 25% 0 31.87%
Temperature Fault 28% 0 31.98%
Temperature Fault 32% 0 33.05%
Temperature Fault 35% 0 35.98%
Temperature Fault 38% 0 38.13%
Temperature Fault 40% 0 40.15%
Temperature Fault 42% 0 42.15%
Temperature Fault 45% 0 45.03%
Temperature Fault 48% 0 48%
Temperature Fault 50% 0 49.98%
Temperature Fault 52% 0 52%
Temperature Fault 55% 0 55%
Temperature Fault 58% 0 58%
Temperature Fault 60% 0 60%
Temperature Fault 62% 0 62%
Temperature Fault 65% 0 65%
Temperature Fault 70% 0 70%
Temperature Fault 72% 0 72%
Temperature Fault 75% 0 75%
Temperature Fault 80% 0 80%
Temperature Fault 82% 0 82%
Temperature Fault 85% 0 85%
Temperature Fault 92% 0 92%
Temperature Fault 95% 0 95%
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Table 4.10: Actual and classiﬁcation results under 20 diﬀerent bus voltage fault cases
- DNN method.
Fault type Actual Fault Classiﬁed Fault Estimated Fault
Severity Type Severity
Bus Voltage Fault 45% -0.97 98.87%
Bus Voltage Fault 50% -0.99 50%
Bus Voltage Fault 53% -0.99 53%
Bus Voltage Fault 55% -0.99 55%
Bus Voltage Fault 58% -1 58%
Bus Voltage Fault 60% -1 60%
Bus Voltage Fault 62% -1 62%
Bus Voltage Fault 65% -1 65%
Bus Voltage Fault 68% -1 68%
Bus Voltage Fault 70% -1 70%
Bus Voltage Fault 73% -1 73%
Bus Voltage Fault 75% -1 75%
Bus Voltage Fault 78% -1 78%
Bus Voltage Fault 80% -1 80%
Bus Voltage Fault 82% -1 82%
Bus Voltage Fault 85% -1 85%
Bus Voltage Fault 88% -1 88%
Bus Voltage Fault 90% -1 90%
Bus Voltage Fault 92% -1 92%
Bus Voltage Fault 95% -1 95%
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Table 4.11: Actual fault type and classiﬁcation results under diﬀerent fault cases -
DNN method.
Fault type Number of faulty scenarios Correctly Wrongly
classiﬁed classiﬁed
Bus voltage fault 20 20 0
Motor current fault 30 30 0
Temperature fault 30 29 1
Table 4.12: Actual fault severity and estimated fault severity under diﬀerent fault
cases - DNN method.
Fault type Number of faulty scenarios Correctly Poorly Wrongly
estimated estimated estimated
Bus voltage fault 20 19 0 1
Motor current fault 30 25 5 0
Temperature fault 30 25 5 0
poorly classiﬁed. Table 4.12 shows a quantitative analysis of the fault severity esti-
mation results for various actuator fault scenarios.
Table 4.13 shows the error in fault severity estimation under the above 80 faulty
scenarios (including 30 motor current fault scenarios, 30 temperature fault scenarios
and 20 bus voltage scenarios). The average fault severity estimation error is depicted
in Table 4.13 for various actuator fault scenarios.
Table 4.13: Actual fault severity and estimation results under diﬀerent fault cases -
DNN method.
Fault type Average fault severity estimation error
Bus voltage fault 2.7%
Motor current fault 0.9%
Temperature fault 1.5%
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4.5.2 Analysis of the Results for the Static Neural Network-
Based Method for Fault Type Classiﬁcation and Fault
Severity Estimation
In order to evaluate the classiﬁcation capabilities of the proposed static neural network-
based (SNN) method, 30 diﬀerent motor current fault scenarios are considered and
the 30 fault scenarios and the output of neural network classiﬁer for these scenarios
have been described clearly in Table 4.14. Table 4.15 shows the actual 30 temperature
fault scenarios and the output of the neural classiﬁer for the fault type and the fault
severity values under these 30 scenarios. The estimated values and the actual values
for fault type and fault severity results in 20 diﬀerent fault scenarios are listed in
Table 4.16.
In Tables 4.14-4.16 the classiﬁcation results for 80 diﬀerent faulty scenarios,
including 30 temperature fault scenarios, 30 motor current fault scenarios and 20 bus
voltage fault scenarios that are described above are shown. Table 4.17 and Table
4.18 show the number of patterns in each fault class and the fault type/fault severity
estimation results for various fault scenarios respectively. Table 4.19 shows the fault
severity estimation analysis results for static neural network based method.
Comparing the analysis results in Table 4.18 and Table 4.12 shows that the dy-
namic neural network-based method has higher accuracy in estimating fault severity
(including bus voltage faults, motor current faults and temperature faults) and it has
lower estimation error.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a fault isolation logic and methodology is developed ﬁrst and for
the purpose of fault type recognition and fault severity determination two methods
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Table 4.14: Actual and classiﬁcation results under 30 diﬀerent motor current fault
cases - SNN method.
Fault type Actual Fault Classiﬁed Fault Estimated Fault
Severity Type Severity
Motor Current Fault 10% +1 21.98%
Motor Current Fault 12% +1 29.91%
Motor Current Fault 15% +1 38.04%
Motor Current Fault 20% +1 40.81%
Motor Current Fault 25% +0.78 32.83%
Motor Current Fault 30% +1 40.83%
Motor Current Fault 32% -1.01 50.63%
Motor Current Fault 35% +1 46.32%
Motor Current Fault 38% +1 23.85
Motor Current Fault 42% +1 42.88%
Motor Current Fault 45% +1 46.17%
Motor Current Fault 48% +1 48.08%
Motor Current Fault 50% +1 58.26%
Motor Current Fault 52% +1 52.69%
Motor Current Fault 55% +1 54.37%
Motor Current Fault 58% +1 58.88%
Motor Current Fault 60% +1 65.63%
Motor Current Fault 62% +1 60.25%
Motor Current Fault 65% +1 65.72%
Motor Current Fault 68% +1 68.39%
Motor Current Fault 70% +1 71.03%
Motor Current Fault 72% +1 71.85%
Motor Current Fault 75% +1 75.33%
Motor Current Fault 78% +1 79.66%
Motor Current Fault 80% +1 78.06%
Motor Current Fault 82% -1.01 60.54%
Motor Current Fault 85% -.99 75.07%
Motor Current Fault 88% +1 89.4%
Motor Current Fault 90% +1 88.12%
Motor Current Fault 95% +1 96.36%
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Table 4.15: Actual and classiﬁcation results under 30 diﬀerent temperature fault cases
- SNN method.
Fault type Actual Fault Classiﬁed Fault Estimated Fault
Severity Type Severity
Temperature Fault 10% 0 25.67%
Temperature Fault 12% 0 31.88%
Temperature Fault 15% 0 38.8%
Temperature Fault 18% 0 41.87%
Temperature Fault 20% 0 44.5%
Temperature Fault 22% -0.02 46.4%
Temperature Fault 25% -0.18 85.5%
Temperature Fault 28% 0 38.76%
Temperature Fault 32% 0 85.6%
Temperature Fault 35% 0 61.9%
Temperature Fault 38% 0 21.8%
Temperature Fault 40% 0 62.5%
Temperature Fault 42% 0 59%
Temperature Fault 45% 0 63.1%
Temperature Fault 48% 0 63.6%
Temperature Fault 50% 0 63%
Temperature Fault 52% 0 64%
Temperature Fault 55% 0 64.1%
Temperature Fault 58% 0 64.8%
Temperature Fault 60% 0 64.3%
Temperature Fault 62% 0 65.7%
Temperature Fault 65% 0 67.2%
Temperature Fault 70% 0 71.2%
Temperature Fault 72% 0 73.7%
Temperature Fault 75% 0 77%
Temperature Fault 80% 0 82%
Temperature Fault 82% 0 79.7%
Temperature Fault 85% 0 95%
Temperature Fault 92% 0 80.8%
Temperature Fault 95% 0 85.2%
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Table 4.16: Actual and classiﬁcation results under 20 diﬀerent bus voltage fault cases
- SNN method.
Fault type Actual Fault Classiﬁed Fault Estimated Fault
Severity Type Severity
Bus Voltage Fault 45% -1 43.25%
Bus Voltage Fault 50% -1 61.51%
Bus Voltage Fault 53% -1 62.98%
Bus Voltage Fault 55% -1 63.55%
Bus Voltage Fault 58% -1 64.77%
Bus Voltage Fault 60% -1 66.21%
Bus Voltage Fault 62% -1 67.95%
Bus Voltage Fault 65% -1 69.23%
Bus Voltage Fault 68% -1 70.81%
Bus Voltage Fault 70% -1 72.16%
Bus Voltage Fault 73% -1 73.15%
Bus Voltage Fault 75% -1 76.45%
Bus Voltage Fault 78% -1 78.65%
Bus Voltage Fault 80% -1 80.02%
Bus Voltage Fault 82% -1 82.08%
Bus Voltage Fault 85% -1 86.48%
Bus Voltage Fault 88% -1 89.06%
Bus Voltage Fault 90% -1 91.15%
Bus Voltage Fault 92% -1 91.13%
Bus Voltage Fault 95% -1 94.69%
Table 4.17: Actual and classiﬁcation results under diﬀerent fault cases - SNN method.
Fault type Number of faulty scenarios Correctly Wrongly
classiﬁed classiﬁed
Bus voltage fault 20 16 4
Motor current fault 30 26 4
Temperature fault 30 29 1
Table 4.18: Actual fault severity and estimated fault severity under diﬀerent fault
cases - SNN method.
Fault type Number of faulty scenarios Correctly Poorly Wrongly
estimated estimated estimated
Bus voltage fault 20 19 0 1
Motor current fault 30 18 2 10
Temperature fault 30 9 9 12
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Table 4.19: Actual fault severity and estimation results under diﬀerent fault cases -
Static neural network (SNN) method.
Fault type Average fault severity estimation error
Bus voltage fault 3.25%
Motor current fault 6.66%
Temperature fault 15.5%
are proposed. In the ﬁrst methodology, a two-level dynamic neural network-based
method is developed. In the ﬁrst level, a dynamic neural network is trained by using
the residual signals generated in the formation level fault detection system based
on the extended back-propagation algorithm for the purpose of detecting fault types
that occur in the reaction wheels in the formation ﬂight system. In the second level,
another dynamic neural network is trained based on the analysis of the residual signals
that are generated in the formation level fault detection process for the purpose of
estimating actuator fault severities.
In the second methodology, a static neural-network-based method is proposed
for detecting fault type and estimating the fault severity in the faulty actuator in
the formation ﬂight system. In this methodology, the static neural networks are
trained based on the residual signals that are generated in the formation level fault
detection system by using conventional back-propagation method. The capabilities of
the both proposed schemes (dynamic neural network-based scheme and static neural-
network-based scheme) are evaluated under diﬀerent fault scenarios. The results
presented demonstrate a reliable approach for fault type classiﬁcation and severity
determination for actuator faults.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis the problem of fault detection and isolation (FDI) for a formation ﬂying
of satellites is investigated. Due to the capability of dynamic neural networks (DNNs)
to cope with nonlinearity, complexity, uncertainty and noisy and corrupted data, in
this work DNNs are employed to solve the problem of fault detection and isolation of
the attitude control subsystem (ACS) of a satellite. In this thesis a dynamic neural
network-based FDI system is designed and developed to detect and isolate the faults
in the reaction wheels of satellites located in any of three axes of the satellites in the
formation. Various FDI systems for single spacecraft missions have been previously
developed in the literature [43], [150], [13], [18], [29]. Unfortunately these local fault
diagnosis schemes fail to detect and isolate low severity faults that occur in the re-
action wheels of a spacecraft. Although these low severity faults may not cause any
serious problem in a single satellite missions, they may cause serious impact on the
satellite’s attitude or rates in a formation ﬂight mission of a network of satellites.
In this thesis, a decentralized FDI system is proposed for detecting and isolating
actuator faults in a formation ﬂight mission. Unlike the local FDI systems (that use
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absolute measurements of a spacecraft) the formation ﬂying FDI systems use relative
attitude measurements collected from sensors of the 3-axes attitude control subsystem
of the satellite in the formation. The formation ﬂying FDI system is developed based
on the DNN approach in order to identify normal and faulty modes of operation. The
DNN is constructed based on the dynamic multilayer perceptron (DMLP) network
in which static neurons are replaced with dynamic neuron model.
Two diﬀerent FDI topologies have been investigated in this thesis. In the ﬁrst
topology the DNNs in each satellite are trained based on the relative attitude of that
satellite with respect to its adjacent neighbor in the bidirectional ring topology. In
this approach when a fault occurs in one axis of one of satellites in the formation,
the DNN located along the faulty axis of faulty spacecraft can detect and isolate the
fault immediately, and the DNN in the neighboring satellite can detect the fault after
a time delay.
The capabilities of this approach are evaluated by using a confusion matrix anal-
ysis method. In this fault scheme, the DNN located in faulty axis of faulty spacecraft
can detect 100% of the faulty signals correctly and the DNN of the neighboring
spacecraft can detect 76% of the faulty signals correctly. The accuracey (87%) and
precision (82%) level is also acceptable in this method.
In the second approach, DNNs of each spacecraft use the relative attitude mea-
surements of that spacecraft with respect to its two nearest adjacent neighbors in
the bidirectional ring topology. The capability of this proposed scheme is also in-
vestigated under diﬀerent faulty scenarios and its capability is evaluated using the
confusion matrix method. In this approach, the DNN located in the faulty axis of
the faulty spacecraft can detect 100% of the faulty signals correctly (without a time
delay) and the DNNs located in its two neighboring satellites can detect the actuator
fault after a short time delay (compared to the ﬁrst fault detection topology) and
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they can classify 87% of faulty signals correctly. The accuracey (92%) and precision
(88%) levels are improved as compared to the ﬁrst fault detection topology.
The proposed fault diagnosis scheme has the capability of detecting and isolating
faults at the same time. Fault isolation is the practice of determination of faulty
actuator in the formation and isolating it from other actuators in the system. In
general, three reaction wheels are embedded in a spacecraft system, and each of them
is located along one of the three axes of the spacecraft. In our proposed formation
ﬂying fault detection system, a dynamic neural network is embedded along each axis
of each satellite in the formation. In this way, not only one can detect a fault, but
also isolate the faulty actuator in the formation.
In general three types of faults may occur in reaction wheels of a spacecraft;
namely bus voltage faults, motor current faults and viscous temperature faults. In
order to classify the type of faults in the attitude control subsystem of any of the
satellites in the formation, two neural network-based methodologies (dynamic neural
network-based (DNN) and static neural network-based (SNN)) are employed after
the residual generator in each axis of each satellite. These neural network classiﬁers
use information from the residual signal generated in the faulty axis of the faulty
satellite (before and after the fault occurrence) to train the neural networks. Finally,
two methodologies for fault severity determination are also proposed and developed.
When the severity of the actuator faults in a satellite increase, the magnitude of the
residual signal in the faulty axis of the faulty satellite in the formation before and
after the fault occurrence increase. This property has been used for developing a fault
severity determination scheme.
5.2 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of the work developed in this thesis are detailed as follows:
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• In this thesis, a DNN-based decentralized fault detection and isolation method
for the reaction wheels of the satellites in a formation ﬂight is developed. In this
method, the DNN located in each axis of a satellite in the formation is trained
based on the relative attitude measurements of that satellite and its neighboring
satellite(s). In this thesis, two diﬀerent topologies have been investigated: In
the ﬁrst topology, the DNNs of the satellite #i in the formation is trained using
the relative attitude of satellite #i and satellite #(i+1). In this fault detection
scheme, when a fault occurs in one of the reaction wheels of satellite #i in the
formation, the DNN located in the corresponding axis of the satellite #i can
detect the fault without a time delay, and the DNN located in the corresponding
axis of the satellite #(i−1) can detect the fault after a short time delay. In the
second topology, the DNNs of the satellite #i in the formation are trained using
the relative attitude of satellite #i and its two neighboring satellites, namely
satellite #(i− 1) and satellite #(i+1). In this fault detection method, when a
fault occurs in a reaction wheel in satellite #i, the DNN in the corresponding
axis of satellite #i is capable of detecting the actuator fault immediately, and
the DNNs in satellite #(i−1) and #(i+1) can detect the fault after a short time
delay. By using these two proposed fault detection schemes, the fault occurrence
in a satellite in the formation mission, can be detected either in the local fault
detection system of the faulty satellite or in the fault detection systems of its
neighboring satellite(s).
• The proposed fault detection schemes are capable of detecting low severity faults
that occur in the reaction wheels of satellites in the formation. The single satel-
lite fault detection system can detect high severity faults in the reaction wheels
of the satellite, but it fails to detect low severity faults in the actuators of the
satellite. These low severity actuator faults do not have any serious impact on
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the attitude or rates of a single satellite, but in formation ﬂying missions, low
severity actuator faults can result in serious deviations from mission speciﬁca-
tions and they may lead to catastrophic failure in the entire formation. Devel-
oping a fault detection scheme that is capable of detecting both high severity
and low severity faults in the formation mission is the second contribution of
this thesis.
• The proposed methodology shows a high level of accuracy (98%) and precision
(100%) and the mis-classiﬁcation rate and false faulty parameters are small (2%)
in the confusion matrix analysis. Therefore, the proposed DNN-based fault
detection method fulﬁlls the expected requirements of accuracy and precision
with minimum mis-classiﬁcation rate and false alarms.
• The proposed methodology is capable of detecting and isolating the actuator
faults at the same time. In both schemes, a DNN is located in three axes of each
satellite in the formation. Once a fault occurs in one of the actuators of any
of the satellites in the formation, the DNN that is located in the corresponding
axis can detect the fault without a time delay. This property is used for isolation
purpose.
• Two neural network-based methods (DNN-based method and SNN-based method)
are employed to determine the fault type and the fault size in the faulty actu-
ator. The DNN that is located in each axis of each satellite in the formation is
followed by a static/dynamic neural network. These neural networks are trained
based on the residual signal that is generated in the DNN-based residual gener-
ator in the faulty axis and then the trained neural networks are used to classify
the fault type and estimate the fault severity.
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5.3 Suggestions for Future Work
Based on the results obtained in this thesis, the suggested future work can be focused
on the following areas:
• Since in this thesis a decentralized fault diagnosis scheme is proposed, a fault
in one satellite can be observed by its adjacent satellites in the formation as
well. Although this provides a more reliable fault diagnosis approach, in case
of multiple faults a more advanced technique for isolating faulty actuators and
fault type determination is required.
• A fault recovery system may be developed for the formation ﬂight of satellites
that fulﬁlls the mission objective. An automated or operator-initiated fault
recovery procedure can be developed to correct the eﬀect of fault in the system
after detecting and isolating the fault and bring the formation system back to
the normal state.
• Developing a fault detection system that is capable of detecting both the actu-
ator and sensor faults can also be considered as a future work.
• In this thesis, the time delay in the communications among the satellites in
the formation is ignored. By considering the communication time delays, the
precision of the fault detection process can be increased.
• Developing a fault detection system that can continue to work in case of loss/failure
of an agent in the formation ﬂying missions is also suggested for future work.
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